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In 1994 Gene Sharp, founder of the Albert Einstein Institution, which advances the study 
of nonviolent action, met former Estonian minister of defense Hain Rebas and suggested 
that civil resistance be added to Estonian Defense Policy. The idea never materialized. 
The current National Defense Policy and National Defense Strategy do not include civil 
resistance. The Estonian National Defense Development Plan for 2013‒2022 states that 
military capability at the end of 2022 will consist of up to 90,000 soldiers, which is less 
than 10 percent of the Estonian population. Comprehensive state defense does not use the 
nation’s non-military capability even though there is recognition that civil resistance is an 
important force multiplier. This thesis urges Estonia to reconsider Sharp’s proposal.  
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Throughout the centuries, security issues have shaped military policies, defense 
strategies and military forces. Unlike big states, small states often have limited options to 
defend their sovereignty. They also try to imitate the armed forces of big states. Sandor 
Fabian argues that, “[small states] should innovate by starting to ‘harvest from the edges 
of strategic thought,’1—particularly thinking about irregular warfare—to enhance their 
prospects for successful self-defense and national survival.”2 Fabian adds, “They should 
look for a less usual, less generally accepted, but possibly more effective solution, which 
should include the integration of guerilla warfare and other irregular warfare methods 
into their homeland-defense strategy.”3 One potential solution for small states could be 
integrating standing military forces with civilian mobilization. 
Estonia as a small state has taken an irregular approach and has combined military 
and non-military capabilities for national defense, which is described as comprehensive 
state defense. The role of civil mobilization is defined in the National Security Concept 
of Estonia, which states “Estonia’s security is strengthened by its civil society where 
civic initiative plays [an] important role in the enhancement of national security and 
advancement of the sense of security.”4 According to the National Defense Strategy, if 
Estonia loses territory to the enemy during conflict, Estonian citizens inside occupied 
areas will be organized as a resistance element for continuous struggle.5  
1 John Arquilla, “Warfare in the Information Age’’ (lecture notes, Defense Analysis Department, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, Spring 2011). 
2 Sandor Fabian, “Professional Irregular Defence Forces: The Other Side of COIN’’ (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 165. 
3 Ibid., 29. 
4 Estonian Ministry of Defense, “National Security Concept of Estonia,” unofficial translation, 
4,http://kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/nodes/9470_National_Security_Concept_of_Estonia.pdf. 
5 Estonian Ministry of Defense, “National Defense Strategy,” 8, 
http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/img/files/KM_riigikaitse_strateegia_eng%282%29.pdf. 
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Civilian contribution to national defense could be implemented in various ways 
and under various conditions. The civil contribution could be multifaceted, passive or 
active, violent or nonviolent, starting with civilian-based defense or unarmed civil 
resistance and ending with guerilla or insurgency warfare in case of armed conflict and 
occupation. In theory, civil defense is designed to play a critical role in the total defense 
approach. The concept, however, is not yet operationalized to support comprehensive 
state defense. In 1991, Estonian political and military stakeholders recognized the 
importance of civil resistance. Bruce Jenkins notes that, 
In a meeting in Toompea Castle, then Minister of State Raivo Vare 
(deputy prime minister and acting defense minister) expressed his view of 
nonviolent resistance as a part of a ‘total defense’ system and as a ‘second 
stage’ in a defense struggle. The Estonian military Chief of Staff, Mr. Ants 
Laaneots, agreed that nonviolent resistance was necessary in the event of a 
massive attack, but felt that it should be combined with types of guerrilla 
warfare.6  
At the end of 1993, Christopher Kruegler, president of the Albert Einstein 
Institution, noted the potential path for small states like Estonia:  
Many small states like Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, where the AEI 
[Albert Einstein Institution] has been especially active, are certainly not 
going to put all their security eggs in the basket of civilian-based defense. 
But they are going to continue thoughtful and deliberate development of 
the CBD [Civilian Based Defense] alternative as a component of their 
overall strategy, and we are going to continue to be with them as they 
carry on in that direction.7  
Krueger’s argument about the potential of civil defense for small states has been 
partially realized after two decades. Estonia, as a small state, has implemented a 
comprehensive national defense approach through the Integrated National Defense 
Concept and National Defense Strategy. Estonia’s need for integrated national defense is 
explained here:  
6 Bruce Jenkins, “Civilian-Based Defense Discussed in Moscow and Baltics,” Nonviolent Sanctions: 
News from The Albert Einstein Institution III, no. 3 (Winter 1991/92): 5, http://www.aeinstein.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/nvs-vol.-3-no.3.pdf. 
7 Christopher Kruegler, “The Development of Civilian Based Defense,” Nonviolent Sanctions: News 
from the Albert Einstein Institution, Special Double Issue (Fall 1993/Winter 1994): 4, 
http://www.aeinstein.org/organizations/org/16_fall93_win94-1.pdf. 
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An integrated approach to national defense represents one of the most 
important principles for the implementation of Estonian defense policies. 
According to the approach observed by the Riigikogu [Parliament], the 
pooled efforts of [the] whole state will be implemented to ensure Estonia’s 
security in the event of a military threat. Therefore, national defense has a 
scope that extends beyond military defense and which also involves 
international activities, civil sector support to military national defense, 
psychological defense, ensuring domestic security, and the consistence of 
vital services—regardless of the threat scenario.8 
The integrated state defense approach heavily emphasizes non-military actions. At 
the same time, the National Security Concept defines civil mobilization as a critical part 
of success. The 2010 National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia (NSC) states 
the following: 
 National defense 
To prevent and repel military action against Estonia all capabilities will be 
used pursuant to the principle of total defense, including the efforts of 
state structures and the population.9 In case of military action against 
Estonia, the national defense system will be implemented 
comprehensively, consisting of military defense, civil contribution to 
military defense, international activity, ensuring of internal security, 
securing the resilience of critical services, and psychological defense. 
Estonia is continuously preparing for national defense, and will defend 
itself in any circumstance and against an enemy of any superiority. 
National defense is organized following the principles of civilian 
control.10 
8 Estonian Ministry of Defense, under “Defense Policy,” last updated April 7, 2014, 
http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/en/defence-policy. 
9 According to the former chief of defense 2005‒2011, General Ants Laaneots: “Total defense means 
that the mental, physical, economic and other potential of government structures, local governments, 
defense forces and the entire nation must be in a continual state of preparedness to manage a situation of 
crisis and to act as one in order to prevent and avert danger or attack and to preserve the nation. There are 
five components to total defense: psychological defense, civil defense, economic defense, civil 
preparedness and military defense…. Civil defense means a set of non-military defensive functions 
performed in the event of crisis or war, the objectives of which are: preservation of the functions of the 
government (maintaining the operation of the Riigikogu [Parliament], the government and local 
government agencies, and of the legal system, and guaranteeing public order), protection of the population 
and the property of the population and of the state, the provision and guaranteeing of essential services and 
consumer goods for the population, minimizing of the effects of the enemy’s attacks on the society, and 
dealing with emergencies created as a result thereof [MDSE].” Estonica, Encyclopedia about Estonia, 
“Total Defense,” last modified February 10, 2012, 
http://www.estonica.org/en/National_defence_system/Total_defence/. 
10 Estonian Ministry of Defense, “National Security Concept of Estonia,” unofficial translation, 13, 
http://kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/nodes/9470_National_Security_Concept_of_Estonia.pdf. 
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The concept strongly emphasizes civilian aspects of national defense, referred to 
as “civil contribution to military defense.” 
In this rapidly evolving security environment, the most serious potential 
threats to Estonia derive from hybrid and combined challenges and from a 
combination of internal and external developments. Therefore, national 
defense can no longer be limited to military defense alone. Only a 
comprehensive approach to defense can guarantee a country’s security. 
Based on this central idea, the 2011 National Defense Strategy stipulates 
that all major Estonian state authorities shall participate in national 
defense, thus combining military forces with non-military capabilities.11 
The National Defense Strategy includes six courses of action including “civilian 
sector support to military action.”12 The National Defense Strategy, however, provides 
little guidance on how to operationalize nonmilitary capabilities such as civil resistance. 
Estonian military officials have failed to study whether social movement theory could 
help bridge this void.  
Civil resistance, even when it is unarmed, can be a powerful force. According to 
Mohandas Gandhi (Mahatma), “This force gains its strength from the fact that even the 
most powerful cannot rule without the co-operation of the ruled.”13 In other words, civil 
resistance would fill the gap and make military defense more comprehensive. By 
incorporating civil resistance, the Estonian total defense concept can strengthen national 
security and be an indirect strategy to deter future aggressions.  
At the same time, it is strategically clever to combine civil resistance with violent 
struggle. Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan highlight the strategic power of civil 
resistance when combining it with violent struggle. Chenoweth and Stephan state, “Our 
perspective does not assume that nonviolent resistance methods can melt the hearts of 
repressive regimes or dictators. Instead, we argue that as with some successful violent 
11 Estonian Ministry of Defense, “National Defense Strategy,” 3, 
http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/img/files/KM_riigikaitse_strateegia_eng%282%29.pdf. 
12 Ibid., 10. 
13 Maciej J. Bartkowski et al., “Recovering Nonviolent History,” in Recovering Nonviolent History, 
Civil Resistance In Liberation Struggles, ed. Maciej J. Bartowski (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2013), 3. 
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movements, nonviolent campaigns can impose costly sanctions on their opponents, 
resulting in strategic gains.”14  
Little systematic research, however, has been done to synthesize civil resistance 
with comprehensive national defense. This thesis posits that social movement theory has 
much to offer to operationalize civil defense and civil preparedness.  
B. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS 
In 1994, Estonian Defense Minister Enn Tupp wrote the foreword to Gene 
Sharp’s book Civilian-Based Defense: A Post-Military Weapon System. Tupp clearly 
identifies the problem and states, “Our forces are weak and we must use all options 
available to reinforce and hold our independence. This we must learn and adopt, using 
stratagems as David with the stubbornness of the Kalev folk.”15 
Since 1994, Estonia has taken a major step forward and is currently implementing 
a comprehensive approach to state defense. Nevertheless, the strategic potential of civil 
resistance, which is an irregular method of struggle, has unfortunately not been fully 
recognized. Therefore, it is not included in comprehensive state defense. The research 
question and hypotheses in this thesis stem from analysis of the Estonian National 
Security Concept and National Defense Strategy. The analysis has identified a major gap. 
Specifically, the use of nonmilitary capabilities in the comprehensive state defense 
strategy is inadequate. The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the strategic potential 
of civil resistance and to urge its extension onto the irregular battlefield. In particular, this 
thesis focuses on the primary research question: What are the requirements for successful 
civil resistance under occupation? 
14 Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, “The Success of Nonviolent Resistance Campaigns,” in 
Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict, ed. Bruce Hoffman (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2013), 18. 
15 Enn Tupp, foreword to Gene Sharp’s book, Civilian-Based Defense: A Post-Military Weapon 
System, foreword translated by Margus Kuul, book translated by Tiia Kaare (Tallinn: Infomare, 1994). 
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C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This thesis employs case studies to examine the relative significance of the 
hypothesis in two integrated phases. The first part of the analysis identifies a set of 
requirements for effective civil resistance by analyzing social movement literature and 
strategic nonviolence literature. Additionally, discussion of principles found in the 
unconventional warfare literature supplements this analysis. The second part of the 
analysis uses these principles, identified in Chapter II in four case studies, to test the 
hypotheses. 
The results of the analyses will help establish whether the utility of civil 
resistance is significant across diverse operational environments. Ultimately, the analyses 
will validate critical factors for effective civil resistance and the process and sequence of 
its development.  
Case selection is based on two principles. First, the cases encompass the most 
variation on the outcome of civil resistance in order to isolate those principles closely 
associated with effectiveness. Effectiveness is tentatively defined by the degree of 
success achieved. In other words, this thesis will include both successful and 
unsuccessful cases from the list of civil resistance campaigns included in Appendix A. I 
use Gene Sharp’s definitions for full and partial success. According to Sharp, full success 
means that “all (or almost all)” of the goals during or soon after the nonviolent struggle 
have been achieved. Partial success in civil resistance occurs when “only some of those 
goals are achieved.”16 I consider civil resistance to have failed when no goals have been 
achieved. 
The primary sources for cases are The Casebook of Insurgency and Revolutionary 
Warfare Volume I and II and Why Civil Resistance Works. Combined, I propose to 
examine the following cases: The Cedar Revolution in Lebanon (2005, full success), The 
Singing Revolution in Estonia (1989, full success), The Druze Resistance in Israel (1981, 
partial success), and The Kosovo Albanian Resistance in Yugoslavia (1981, failure).  
16 Gene Sharp, “Three Ways Success May Be Achieved,” in The Politics of Nonviolent Action: The 
Dynamics of Nonviolent Action, ed. Marina Finkelstein (Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 2000), 766.  
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It should be noted that while definitions of civil resistance vary, they all highlight 
the employment of civilian networks and organizations as a form of warfare. In this 
regard, this thesis uses the concept of civil resistance defined by Stephan and Chenoweth. 
They define it as follows: “Civil resistance employs social, psychological, economic, and 
political methods, including boycotts (social, economic, political), strikes, protests, sit-
ins, stay-always, and other acts of civil disobedience and noncooperation to mobilize 
publics to oppose or support different policies, to delegitimize adversaries, and to remove 
or restrict adversaries’ sources of power.”17 In other words, civil resistance is not 
necessarily, nor always purely, nonviolent or unarmed. Whether civil resistance should be 
violent or not is a tactical consideration.  
Mohandas Gandhi and Gene Sharp recognize civil resistance as a form of warfare. 
Sharp argues, “In this special type of asymmetrical conflict, the opponent’s violent action 
is always confronted indirectly, i.e., not by the same type of action in direct confrontation 
but by nonviolent resistance and intervention.”18 Similarly, Chenoweth and Stephan 
state, “We are explicit in conceptualizing civil resistance as a form of unconventional 
warfare, albeit one that employs different weapons and applies force differently.”19 
Andrew Mack in his writing clearly identifies nonviolent action as a form of 
unconventional warfare.20 Kurt Schock recognizes civil resistance as asymmetric 
conflict.21  
History has shown that civil resistance remains largely less violent, and tends to 
be more effective than armed insurgencies. Sharp noted in 1990 that more movements 
that employed civil resistance liberated people under communist rule than armed groups 
sponsored by the Pentagon and CIA.22  
17 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 12. 
18 Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, 453. 
19 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 18. 
20 Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” World 
Politics, 27, no. 2 (January 1975): 195, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009880. 
21 Kurt Schock, “The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance,” Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 277 
(2013): 277, doi:10. 1177/0022343313476530.  
22 Gene Sharp, “The Power and Potential of Nonviolent Struggle,” Nonviolent Sanctions: News from 
The Albert Einstein Institution, Special Double Issue (Spring, Summer 1990): 3. 
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Sharp’s claim is strongly supported by evidence from various sources. Chenoweth 
and Stephan in their empirical analysis reach the following conclusions about civil 
resistance: “From this data, we find support for the perspective that nonviolent resistance 
has been strategically superior to violent resistance during the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries.”23 They add, “Our findings show that major nonviolent campaigns have 
achieved success 53 percent of the time, compared with 26 percent for violent resistance 
campaigns.”24 It should be noted that Chenoweth and Stephan’s work does have a coding 
issue where they treat civil resistance campaigns as nonviolent. In other words, what they 
demonstrate is the utility of civil resistance, rather than nonviolent resistance.  
Chenoweth and Stephan compared the efficacy of violent and nonviolent 
campaigns and concluded that, in general, nonviolent movements have a greater chance 
of success. They also compared and contrasted largely nonviolent campaigns and found 
that the successful efforts shared a number of critical factors, such as existing social 
organization, strong leadership and clear strategy. Again, it should be noted that 
Chenoweth and Stephan label campaigns with mixed violent and nonviolent means as 
nonviolent as long as they do not use lethal weapons.  
In a similar vein, Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman point out that civil 
resistance played a major role in numerous conflicts over the past three decades. They 
note, “…The force of civic resistance was a key factor in driving 50 of 67 transitions, or 
over 70 percent of countries where transitions began as dictatorial systems fell and/or 
new states arose from the disintegration of multinational states.”25  
  
23 Chenoweth and Stephan analyzed “…323 cases from 1900 to 2006 of major nonviolent and violent 
campaigns seeking regime change, the expulsion of foreign occupiers, or secession. This research is the 
first to catalog, compare, and analyze all known cases of major armed and unarmed insurrections during 
this period.” Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 17. 
24 Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, “ Why Civil Resistance Works, The Strategic Logic of 
Nonviolent Conflict,” International Security 33, no. 1 (Summer, 2008): 8, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40207100. 
25 Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman, How Freedom is Won: From Civic Resistance to Durable 
Democracy (New York: Freedom House, 2005): 6, http://agnt.org/snv/resources/HowFreedomisWon.pdf. 
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At the same time, it is important to remember that civil resistance has not always 
been successful. Nonviolent civil resistance failed in South Korea in 1979, Pakistan in 
1983, South Africa in 1952‒1961, Panama in 1987‒1989, China in 1956‒1957, Burma in 
1988, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Hungary in 1956, Tibet in 1987‒1989 and many other 
places around the world.26 Civil resistance movements have failed for numerous reasons 
and have often occurred as spontaneous activities. In this context, Michael Nagler argues, 
“[t]oo often, people try a kind of nonviolence that is unsystematic: they may have the best 
of intentions, but their nonviolence is of the ‘make-it-up-as-you-go-along’ variety. This is 
grossly inadequate.”27 This observation highlights that civil resistance works best when it 
is part of a disciplined strategy. 
Many societies and regimes, democratic and nondemocratic, small and large 
states, have experienced civil resistance against coercive rulers and occupational forces. 
Despite the success of civil resistance, it has not been emphasized in the context of 
national defense. At the same time, this often forgotten strategy has frequently proved to 
be the only viable method of struggle for people under occupation by authoritative 
regimes. 
Examples of civil resistance appear in ancient science and modern fiction. For 
instance, Russian writer Leo Tolstoy emphasized noncooperation and nonviolence in The 
Kingdom of God Is with You. Henry David Thoreau promoted civil disobedience in his 
book Resistance to Civil Government.28 Another famous American writer, John 
Steinbeck, illustratively described “people power” and strategic logic behind the civil 
resistance in his book The Moon Is Down.29 Steinbeck describes civil resistance in a 
small town in 1941 during WWII somewhere in Northern Europe. A small state is rapidly 
occupied by a coercive regime. The regime is trying to mine the coal from the small 
26 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 233‒336. 
27 Robert J. Burrowes, “Planning and Organizing Nonviolent Defence,” The Strategy of Nonviolent 
Defense: A Gandhian Approach (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 181. 
28 Schock, “The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance,” 277. 
29 People power is defined as, “The power capacity of a mobilized population and its institutions using 
nonviolent forms of struggle. The term was especially used during the 1986 Philippine nonviolent 
insurrection.” Albert Einstein Institution, “A Brief Glossary of Nonviolent Struggle,” in Nonviolent 
Sanctions: News from The Albert Einstein Institution I, no. 3 (Winter 1989/90): 5. 
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town’s coal mine and thereby secure energy resources for military operations. Unarmed 
civilians, despite the coercive regime’s lethal methods, keep engaging in conflict without 
firearms. They use largely nonviolent methods and delay coal production. At the end of 
their campaign, they shift to violent action and use dynamite and sabotage to destroy the 
coal mine.30 Steinbeck describes the power of civil resistance through conversation 
between Colonel Lanser, the commander of the occupation force, and local collaborator 
Corell. Colonel Lanser very clearly understands the hardship and does not underestimate 
the power of civil resistance. Colonel Lanser states to Corell: 
There are no peaceful people. When will you learn it? There are no 
friendly people. Can’t you understand that? We have invaded this 
country—you, by what they called treachery, prepared for us.… Can’t you 
understand that we are at war with these people?31 
Colonel Lanser in his own way recognized civil resistance as a strategy of 
irregular warfare and its dynamic utility against occupation. Civil resistance is a weapon 
system for people who are militarily inferior to their opponents. 
In summary, in this chapter I argued that small states, despite limited military 
capability, have options and can more effectively defend their sovereignty using irregular 
approaches. For example, small states can integrate civilian mobilization into state 
defense. Using Estonia’s comprehensive state defense approach as an example, I 
explained that one option for civilian contributions to national defense could be civil 
resistance. I found after analyzing the Estonia National Security Concept and the 
National Defense Strategy that Estonia’s comprehensive state defense does not include 
civil resistance. Nonmilitary capabilities are not effectively used. In this context, I 
explained that civil resistance is an irregular form of warfare and research has proven that 
civil resistance can be effective strategy. Based on analysis, I raise the question, what are 
the requirements for successful civil resistance under occupation? 
30 Sharp’s conceptual definition of sabotage is “acts of demolition and destruction of property,” which 
he considers inappropriate for nonviolent struggle. Gene Sharp, “Solidarity and Discipline to Fight 
Repression,” Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential (Boston: Porter 
Sargent Publishers, Inc. 2005), 390. 
31 John Steinbeck, The Moon Is Down (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), 35. 
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In the next chapter, by investigating scholarly research on the subject fields, 
including social movements and irregular warfare literature, my intent is to summarize 
and distill characteristics of successful civil resistance. In addition, I propose some 
hypotheses for further research that are directly distilled from the literature review. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
“Violence works like a hammer, while nonviolence works more like a lever.”32 
–Kurt Schock 
Noteworthy contributions to civil resistance research have been made by scholars 
such as Gene Sharp, Kurt Schock, Peter Ackerman, Christopher Kruegler, Jack Du Vall, 
Masciej. J. Bartowski, Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan. In the social movement 
field, scholars such as Sidney Tarrow, Joseph Davis, Franscesca Polletta and Robert 
Bendford give insight into how social movements are related to organization and 
narrative. The Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volumes I and II 
highlights important requirements for irregular warfare, including civil resistance. 
First, it must be noted that civil resistance literature reveals a simple 
misconception. Peter Ackerman and Jack Du Vall state, “The greatest misconception 
about conflict in our century is that violence is always the ultimate form of power, that no 
other method of advancing a just cause or defeating injustice can surpass it.”33 Civil 
resistance as an irregular strategy of struggle is not always recognized, and therefore, 
leads to many misconceptions.  
In their research, Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan “…neither foreign state 
support, nor international sanctions, nor regime crackdown seem to positively or 
negatively affect the outcome of nonviolent campaigns.”34 They add, “The vast majority 
of nonviolent campaigns have emerged in authoritarian regimes where even peaceful 
opposition against the government may have fatal consequences.”35 At the same time, 
both scholars maintain “…that violent regime repression reduces the likelihood of 
campaign success by nearly 35 percent.”36 External, international political and financial 
32 Schock, “The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance,” 283. 
33 Peter Ackerman and Jack Du Vall, “Nonviolent Power in the Twentieth Century,” Political Science 
and Politics 33, no. 2 (June 2000): 148 http://www.jstor.org/stable/420882. 
34 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 59. 
35 Ibid., 66. 
36 Ibid., 68. 
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support could have positive or negative effects. Chenoweth and Stephan note that 
external support can create many obstacles like the free-rider problem. Participation 
decreases when the people feel foreigners will win the fight for them. The population 
may not support civil resistance if external support comes from an unpopular third party. 
Based on their research, 90 percent of civil resistance movements that have conducted 
successful mobilization and that have had popular support did not receive direct financial 
support from foreigners.37 They conclude, “While foreign support or international 
sanctions may have been critical in some cases, there is no general pattern indicating that 
they are necessary for successful campaign outcomes.”38  
Chenoweth and Stephan, referring to another study, conclude that “factors such as 
regime type, level of economic development, literacy rate, factionalism of society along 
ethnic, linguistic, and religious lines have not had statistically significant impact on the 
ability of civic movement to achieve success through civil resistance campaigns 
(Marchant et al. 2008).”39 
Chenoweth and Stephan’s work involved the collection of reliable data from 259 
campaigns, 80 of them nonviolent.40 Based on analysis of NAVCO dataset, they found 
that domestic mass participation is paramount for success.41 Mass participation is linked 
to social networks. These scholars emphasize the importance of social networks because 
they create critical social ties among the people.42 These scholars also cite the importance 
of the number and quality of participants, and actions that can create a loyalty shift within 
the opposition regime.43 Chenoweth and Stephan have discovered that high numbers of 
participants are more likely to induce defections among security forces.44 According to 
their analysis, the number and quality of participants are equally important, and 
37 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 54‒55. 
38 Ibid., 59. 
39 Ibid., 63‒64. 
40 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 31. 
41 Ibid., 30. 
42 Ibid., 40. 
43Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 30‒41. 
44 Ibid., 48. 
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participants must maintain a high discipline of nonviolence.45 Researchers agree that a 
violent reaction from a coercive regime may backfire and propel a civil resistance 
movement. They conclude that when a regime violently suppresses civil resistance, and 
the movement remains nonviolent, the likelihood of success rises by approximately 22 
percent.46 
In addition, they have found that “as with any campaign, strategic factors like 
achieving unity around shared goals and methods, establishing realistic goals, assessing 
opponent vulnerabilities and sources of leverage, sequencing tactics, and navigating 
structural constraints including regime repression are also likely to be crucial 
determinants of campaign outcomes.”47 In summary, the research of Chenoweth and 
Stephan indicates that the following factors are critical: mass participation, social 
networks, quality and quantity of participants, regime loyalty shift, backfire effect, and 
security force detection, as well as maintenance of a nonviolent strategy, discipline, unity, 
clear goals, opponent vulnerabilities and leveraging.48 
Sharp, the leading scholar on civil resistance theory, found that a nonviolent 
strategy is paramount in civil resistance.49 He recommends an indirect approach using 
nonviolent methods against an overwhelmingly powerful opponent.50 Sharp describes 
how such a strategy combines all crucial factors and key elements, such as indirect 
approach, geographical and physical elements, timing, numbers and strength, initiative, 
and choice of available weapons and tactics.51  
Sharp explains that civil resistance does not happen spontaneously; resistance 
leaders must plan and initiate events. Consistent with conventional military thinking, he 
considers the exercise of leadership in every stage of civil resistance to be very 
45 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 39. 
46 Ibid., 51. 
47 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 40‒41. 
48 Ibid., 41‒58. 
49 Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, 493‒494. 
50 Ibid., 495‒496. 
51 Ibid., 492‒509.  
 15 
                                                 
important.52 He also notes that the opponents often attempt to remove movement leaders 
although “nonviolent struggle does not need a charismatic leader.”53 Sharp considers 
broad expertise in nonviolent struggle and strategic nonviolent consciousness to be more 
important. Leaders can be individuals or groups.54 Sharp echoes Gandhi, who argued that 
civil resistance campaigns should be led by leaders “who believed nonviolence as a moral 
principle.”55 Sharp adds, “…the maintenance of high quality [high discipline] in 
nonviolent action is necessary at all stages; if it is done when the numbers are small, it 
will make possible a very considerable increase in the numbers of nonviolent actionists 
capable of the strength necessary for effectiveness.”56 
Sharp believes high numbers of participants in civil resistance movements could 
determine the outcome.57 Large numbers, however, do not guarantee success. They could 
be a disadvantage when a crowd is not controlled and does not maintain nonviolent 
discipline.58 Sharp adds that it is important for a resistance organization to make use of 
what he calls ‘pillars of support,’ such as “trade unions, business organizations, religious 
organizations, the bureaucracy, neighborhoods, villages, cities, regions and the like….”59 
Among the pillars of support, Sharp emphasizes the importance of defection, 
especially defection of security forces.60 The regime, having not been able to suppress 
civil resistance, usually demands the security forces use violence and even lethal methods 
to suppress civil resistance. Lethal methods against civilians can cause unrest among the 
security forces and disobedience because of social and family ties. When the regime’s 
52 Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, 462. 
53 Gene Sharp, “Developing a Realistic Alternative to War and Other Violence,” in There are Realistic 
Alternatives (Boston: The Albert Einstein Institution, 2003), 9, http://www.aeinstein.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/TARA.pdf. 
54 Sharp, Waging Nonviolent Struggle, 364. 
55 Ibid., 465.  
56 Ibid., 478. 
57 Ibid., 498. 
58 Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, 498.  
59 Sharp, Waging Nonviolent Struggle, 35. 
60 Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, 667‒669.  
 16 
                                                 
security forces start changing sides, the regime is obviously weakened, and the resistance 
effort gains significant credibility. 
Sharp’s fundamental contribution in this field is his explanation of how civil 
resistance works in theory, what the critical requirements for successful civil resistance 
are and how civil resistance could be operationalized in practice. Through practical 
examples, he concluded that crucial components in civil resistance include strategy, 
leadership, nonviolent discipline, organization, planning, nonviolent action and 
participation by a high number of qualified participants.  
In a similar vein, Kurt Schock concludes that successful civil resistance efforts 
must have clear and limited goals. He states, “…the goals of movements should be well 
chosen, clearly defined, and understood by all parties to the conflict.”61 In addition, he 
recognizes that successful civil resistance movements must have oppositional 
consciousness and organization.62 For Schock, “oppositional consciousness is open-
ended, nontotalizing, and respectful of diversity, and it facilitates the mobilization of a 
broad-based opposition.”63 This consciousness is often created and expanded by strategic 
framing and narrative. 
According to Schock, decentralized network-like organizations have a better 
chance of surviving repression.64 He refers to “multiple channels of resistance,” which 
are successful only when “non-institutional pressure” is used.65 He appears to be 
referring to the strategy that is utilized by and through social networks. Another 
important factor for Schock is efficient employment of different nonviolent methods. He 
specifies protest, persuasion and intervention.66  
61 Kurt Schock, “Trajectories of Unarmed Insurrections,” in Unarmed Insurrections: People Power 
Movements in Nondemocracies, Volume 22, ed. Bert Klandermans (London:University of Minnesota Press, 
2005), 164. 
62 Ibid., 165‒166. 
63 Ibid., 165. 
64 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections, 49‒50. 
65 Ibid., 165. 
66 Ibid., 167. 
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Schock also notes the importance of tactical innovation such as shifting methods 
and making use of different spaces and places. He considers the concentration and 
dispersal of civil resistance activity to be important.67 He also emphasizes the importance 
of communication, through media and third-party entities, as critical strategic elements.68 
For example, civil resistance in Burma in the 1960s, China in the 1980s and Poland in the 
late 1980s used alternative or underground press for political mobilization. The regimes 
restricted access to public media. International media coverage of ongoing civil resistance 
created third-party support in South Africa, Nepal and Thailand.69 
Schock echoes other scholars on the need to cause defections among state security 
forces, especially in cases of civil resistance.70 He says the backfiring effect has a crucial 
connection to tactical action and nonviolent discipline. Both factors, wisely used, increase 
the likelihood of a backfiring effect.71 Backfiring effect is where regime repression leads 
people to more mobilization against coercive regimes. 
While Schock stresses the need for a clear overall strategy, he also emphasizes the 
usefulness of shifting strategy from nonviolent to violent and vice versa. He notes that 
leaders and followers must understand and think at a strategic level.72 Again, it should be 
emphasized that civil resistance is not equal to the complete absence of violent tactics. 
Schock’s critical elements include goals, opposition consciousness, organization, 
strategy, methods, security forces detection, backfiring, nonviolent discipline, strategy 
and leadership. 
In his research, Schock has come to conclude that civil resistance success or 
failure clearly depends on certain requirements. In addition, he has found that success is 
related to overall strategic consciousness and wise use of available civil resistance 
methods during the resistance.  
67 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections, 167‒168. 
68 Ibid., 169. 
69 Ibid., 169‒170. 
70 Schock, “The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance,” 284. 
71 Ibid.  
72 Ibid. 
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Maria Stephan has researched Middle East civil resistance campaigns. Stephan 
concludes that the three key principles of successful resistance are “unity, strategic 
planning, and nonviolent discipline.”73 She notes that civil resistance cells must be united 
and have clear goals and strategies created by the leadership. In the view of Stephan, 
nonviolent discipline has a direct link to loyalty shift.74 In summary, Stephan emphasizes 
critical factors like clear goals, strategy, leadership, nonviolent discipline and regime 
loyalty shift. 
Scholars such as Peter Ackerman and Berel Rodal also have identified three 
crucial but somewhat different elements: planning, nonviolent discipline and 
leadership.75 In their view, the leadership should focus on creating solidarity and defining 
achievable goals.76 Explaining the importance of planning, Ackerman and Rodal 
emphasize tactics and strategy. 
With Christopher Krueger, Ackerman researched six case studies to find factors 
common to successful civil resistance. They offer principles for successful civil 
resistance, but similar factors also were in place within stalemated and unsuccessful 
resistance efforts. In a broad sense, all resistance movements—successful or failed—
made use of identifiable factors like objective, organization, general strategy, and 
nonviolent discipline.77 
  
73 Maria J. Stephan, “What Lessons about Strategic Nonviolent Action Can Be Distilled from Cases 
Discussed in This Book? How Does Skillful Civil Resistance Relate to Democratic Development?” in 
Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East, ed. Maria J. 
Stephan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 311.  
74 Stephan, Civilian Jihad, 311‒314.  
75 Peter Ackerman and Berel Rodal, “The Strategic Dimensions of Civil Resistance,” Global Politics 
and Strategy 50, no. 3 (2008): 117‒120, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330802173131.  
76 Ibid., 117‒118. 
77 Ackerman and Kruegler, “Conclusion,” in Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People 
Power in the Twentieth Century (London: Praeger,1984), 311. 
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Masciej J. Bartowski’s quantitative research of 15 case studies from Africa to 
Europe reveals many of the same crucial factors, including strategy, nonviolent 
discipline, organization, coalition building, unity, and resilience. In addition, he explains 
how organizations reflect the important role of leaders in civil resistance.78 
The U.S. Army manual, Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare 
Volume I and II, explores 46 violent and nonviolent revolutions across the world between 
1933 and 2006. It focuses on factors that describe the form and characteristics of 
revolutionary warfare, but the research framework does not explain why these factors are 
important. The analysis reveals that success or failure of resistance depends on 
“objectives, its leadership and organization, its operations, communications, interactions 
with the surrounding population, and the government’s response.”79 
Sidney Tarrow in his social movement research puts more emphasis on the 
importance of narrative, in the context of social networks and political opportunities.80 
Narrative gives meaning to action. His view is that the narrative legitimizes the 
movement and its actions. As Tarrow explains, “All movements’ leaders proffer 
symbolically laden messages to gain support from followers, attract fence sitters, and 
mark themselves off from opponents.”81 Tarrow correctly argues that all movements gain 
success because of existing social networks and organizations.82 The importance of 
narrative can hardly be overstated. Numerous scholars, including Joseph E. Davis, 
consider it crucial in civil resistance.83 Narrative as a critical factor is not mentioned 
directly by most scholars. It should be. 
78 Bartkowski, Recovering Nonviolent History, 339‒352. 
79 United States Army Special Operations Command and Johns Hopkins University, “Purpose of the 
Casebook,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II, 1962‒2009, ed. Chuck 
Crossett (Fort Bragg: U.S. SOCOM, 2010), viii‒x. 
80 Sidney G. Tarrow, “Networks and Organizations,” in Power in Movements: Social Movements and 
Contentious Politics, ed. Margaret Levi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 120. 
81 Ibid., 142. 
82 Ibid., 183.  
83 Joseph E. Davis, in Stories of Change: Narrative and Social Movements, ed. Joseph E. Davis (New 
York: State University of New York Press, 2002). 
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Social movement scholars consider narrative a very important requirement. 
Storytelling is part of our society and every civil resistance movement has a narrative that 
includes grievances and messages to justify its demands and goals. Joseph Davis explains 
that stories “create and strengthen movement community and collective identity.”84 
Franscesca Polletta argues that the story initiates recruitment before civil resistance 
organizations are created, ignites emotions and creates or blocks emerging strategic 
opportunities.85 Robert Bendford notes that narrative is an important control mechanism 
for social control in civil resistance.86 
An excellent example of powerful master narrative is Pope Urban II’s speech in 
1095 at the Council of Clermont in France, which started the first Crusade. He called on 
Christians to fight for the Holy Land in Jerusalem.87 
A. CHARACTERISTICS OF SUCCESSFUL CIVIL RESISTANCE 
As many scholars note, civil resistance campaigns can have unique 
characteristics. A great many of them, however, also share a few general factors. The 
characteristics for success identified here are based on historical examples of civil 
resistance campaigns. The literature reveals several characteristics associated with 
success. These characteristics are listed in Table 1 and are explained in turn. 
  
84 Davis, Stories of Change: Narrative and Social Movements, 25.  
85 Francesca Polletta, “Plotting Protest,” in Stories of Change: Narrative and Social Movements, ed. 
Joseph E. Davis (New York: State University of New York Press, 2002), 33. 
86 Robert D. Benford, “Controlling Narratives and Narratives as Control within Social Movements,” in 
Stories of Change: Narrative and Social Movements, ed. Joseph E. Davis (New York: State University of 
New York Press, 2002), 53. 
87 Internet Medieval Sourcebook, “Urban II: Speech at Council of Clermont, 1095, according to 
Fulcher of Chartes,” http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/urban2-fulcher.html.  
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Table 1.   Characteristics of Successful Civil Resistance 
• Leadership • Organization and social networks 
• High participation level • Narrative 
• Regime loyalty shift • Doctrine 
• Strategy  
1. Leadership 
Leaders create strategies and campaign plans to shape the movement. Some civil 
resistance leaders such as Gandhi had a strong belief in nonviolence. That does not mean 
that their campaigns always remained nonviolent despite their best efforts. Nevertheless, 
successful civil resistance leaders must understand the strategic utility of nonviolence in 
politically undermining a coercive opponent and shifting opponents Even so, it should 
not be a blind commitment to inaction or nonviolence.  
2. Participation Level 
High participation level means the capability to mobilize people for civil 
resistance. Large movements have ability to undermine a coercive regime’s political 
power. High participation creates legitimacy and makes recruitment easier. High levels of 
participation are typically aided by pre-existing organizations and social networks. 
3. Loyalty Shift 
Regime loyalty shift means that security forces loyal to the regime defect. Loyalty 
shift is related to factors such as coercion and backfiring effect. Loyalty shift can occur 
when the regime is using violence against mass-based civil resistance. Violence, in turn, 




Strategy is a paramount requirement for successful civil resistance. In this 
category, I include methods of struggle, goals and strategic planning. It is important to 
have a strategic plan from the beginning although it can—and sometimes must—be 
adjusted during the course of the campaign. It is critical to note that civil resistance is the 
strategy and must not be confused with the doctrine of nonviolence and discipline, which 
is another critical requirement for effective civil resistance. Nonviolent strategy involves 
numerous unconventional methods of struggle (see Appendix A). 
5. Organization and Social Networks 
Existing organizations and social networks provide numerous resources that can 
increase the effectiveness of unarmed civil resistance. Such resources include 
organizational identity, structure and infrastructure, publicly accepted individual activists, 
kinship, private and media ties, interorganizational relations, communication channels 
and links, and expertise on how to conduct publicly influential collective events.  
6. Narrative 
Strong and powerful narratives of vilification, victimization and injustice mobilize 
people to act against injustice. It is not uncommon that the occupier destroys and 
suppresses the occupied country’s national cultural identity, language and national glory. 
Effective civil resistance must have meaning—the narrative. Eric Hoffner writes in this 
vein, “Mass movements can rise and spread without belief in a God, but never without 
belief in a devil.”88 
7. Doctrine 
A doctrine of nonviolence is a set of principles, including discipline, planning, 
and tactics. While civil resistance can deploy defensive violence, it is paramount that it 
retain its legitimacy by appearing nonviolent until the regime uses excessive violence. 
Doctrine provides a constructive program and evaluation system to maintain civil 
88 Eric. Hoffer, “Unified Agents,” in The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements 
(New York: Harper Collins, 2011), 91. 
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resistance discipline. The main effect of the incremental and proportional action is to 
induce the adversary to use disproportional violence. Disproportional violence, in turn, 
can create more popular and moral support for the resistance movement. Once the 
movement has increasing popular support and moral resonance, it becomes easier for it to 
sustain itself against the more powerful adversary.  
These characteristics identified in the literature review help to answer the research 
question, what are the requirements for successful civil resistance under occupation? In 
addition, the proposed primary and supportive hypotheses are drawn directly from the 
characteristics of successful civil resistance discussed earlier. 
B. PRIMARY AND SUPPORTING HYPOTHESES 
Effective civil resistance can be a critical part of the strategy for total defense 
under occupation. My supporting hypotheses are:  
a. Civil Resistance needs decentralized leadership to be successful. 
b. The higher the participation level, the greater the effectiveness of civil 
resistance. 
c. Increased civil resistance success is directly related to regime loyalty shift. 
d. Civil resistance can be an effective component of total defense when civil 
resistance is integrated with and nested within a broader strategy.  
e. Civil resistance is more effective when it is embedded in existing 
independent and social networks and organizations. 
f. A narrative based on national glorification, victimization, and targeted 
vilification of the enemy can motivate and sustain effective civil defense. 
g. A doctrine of incremental and proportional violence through primarily 
unarmed means can increase the effectiveness of civil defense. 
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III. THE CEDAR REVOLUTION IN LEBANON, 2005 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Syria’s three decades of military and political intervention in Lebanon was ended 
in the spring of 2005 by ordinary Lebanese people. The Cedar Revolution represents 
Lebanon’s remarkable political victory over Syria’s de facto occupation. The political 
victory was achieved entirely through highly disciplined, unarmed civil resistance.  
1. Significance of the Case 
After years of violent struggle against Syrian hegemony, the Lebanese people and 
the international community witnessed highly disciplined unarmed civil resistance. “The 
scope, intensity, and distinctly nonviolent character of the civilian uprising, referred to as 
the Cedar Revolution or the ‘independence intifada,’ was unprecedented in Lebanese 
history.”89 
Two characteristics are noteworthy in the Cedar Revolution. First, it was 
extraordinary that the Lebanese people managed to unite religiously and ethnically 
diverse communities. Second, the movement was a result of a concerted organizational 
effort to maintain a strategy of civil resistance.  
The civil resistance movement maintained a broad political coalition and 
operational sustainability at the strategic level almost from the start of the struggle. Rudy 
Jaagar and Maria Stephan point out, “Over the course of approximately two months, what 
had begun as relatively small, spontaneous protests quickly developed into an organized, 
broad-based opposition movement that would lead to the resignation of the prime 
minister and the withdrawal of Syrian forces, which had occupied Lebanon for almost 30 
years.”90  
89 Rudy Jaagar and Maria J. Stephan, “Lebanon’s Independence Intifada: How an Unarmed 
Insurrection Expelled Syrian Forces,” in Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and 
Governance in the Middle East, ed. Maria J. Stephan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 169.  
90 Ibid. 
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2. Synopsis 
After the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1976, Syria deployed troops in 
Lebanon. The civil war came to an end in 1989, negotiated by the Saudis through the 
Ta’if Convention. For Syria, “Lebanon had long been a base for Syrian opposition to 
Assad; it was an ideal place of exile for political enemies, where they could have 
considerable freedom and be near Syria.”91 In 2000, President Hāfiz Assad died. Syria’s 
long-time control weakened in Lebanon and was challenged by increasing agitation.92 
In August of 2001, Beirut saw unarmed insurrection angered by Syrian 
occupation. Undercover agents arrested 250 demonstrators and attempted to suppress 
demonstrations. Hundreds of Free Patriotic Movement members along with the 
opposition, mainly various Christian parties, protested against Syria’s domination.93 
A few years later, in the autumn of 2004, Rafig Hariri, prime minister of Lebanon 
at that time, met Syria’s President Bashar Assad. Assad ordered Hariri to guarantee 
Lebanese President Emil Lahoud’s reelection. For President Assad, it was critical to 
continue the same politics, because Syrian leadership recognized Lahoud as the person 
accustomed to maintaining cooperative relations with the Syrian leadership based on 
mutual trust. It was a convenient option to Syria, since Lahoud was a weak president with 
no real power base within Lebanon.94  
Hariri understood that his decision to resist openly against the pro-Syrian 
Lebanese government and Assad could end fatally. In September 2004, Hariri’s 
opposition to President Lahoud was at its highest point because Lahoud’s presidential 
reign was about come to an end. The Lebanese Parliament, however, influenced by Syria, 
amended the constitution to extend his term by three years.95  
91 Umar F. Abd-Allah, “The Regime of Hāfiz Assad, The Lebanon Intervention, 1976,” in The Islamic 
Struggle in Syria (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1983), 79. 
92 Jaagar and Stephen, Civilian Jihad, 170. 
93 Ibid., 70. 
94 Eyal Zisser, “Lebanon—the Cedar Revolution—Between Continuity and Change,” Orient-
Hamburg 47, no. 4 (2006): 465. 
95 Jaagar and Stephan, Civilian Jihad, 171. 
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Hariri resigned in autumn 2004 in protest of Lahoud’s reelection. The next year, 
he sent his Future Movement Party representatives to an opposition meeting held at the 
Bristol Hotel.96 It turned out to be a decisive moment for future civil resistance. 
Hariri was assassinated on February 14, 2005, along with bystanders, when a 
huge car bomb exploded in Beirut. The bomb contained at least 1200 kg of explosives.97 
According to Jaafar and Stephan, “Hariri’s assassination united large segments of the 
Lebanese population in grief and anger against their government and the Syrian 
regime.”98 With unarmed insurrections directed against Syria and the Lebanese 
government increasing, opposition leaders gathered on February 18 at the Bristol Hotel 
and announced their demands:99 
The immediate and total withdrawal of Syrian troops, the resignation of 
the government led by Prime Minister Omar Karami, and the holding of 
three parliamentary elections. Their demands were clear, specific, and the 
same ones being made by the Lebanese rallying in the streets. At the press 
conference following the meeting, opposition spokesperson Samir 
Frangieh, wearing a red and white scarf around his neck, announced the 
start of a ‘peaceful and democratic intifada for independence.’100 
Lebanese students, who played a major role in the Cedar Revolution, exhibited 
boldness through their action, which directly affected the course of the revolution.  
On the same evening, a group of Lebanese students belonging to 
opposition parties raised a tent in Martyrs’ Square. Taking a cue from the 
2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, these Lebanese protestors decided to 
build a permanent camp on the site. After the overnight sit-in on 18 
February, other political factions and civil society groups quickly followed 
suit, erecting more tents. The area, dubbed Freedom camp, became the 
opposition’s hub during the popular uprising.101 
96 Jaagar and Stephan, Civilian Jihad, 171. 
97 Nicholas Blanford, Killing Mr. Lebanon: The Assassination of Rafik Hariri and Its Impact on the 
Middle East (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 151. 
98 Jaagar and Stephan, Civilian Jihad, 171. 




                                                 
On February 18, opposition spokesperson Samir Frangieh announced that people 
should start “‘peaceful and democratic intifada for independence.’…One Lebanese 
analyst wrote that the announcement ‘psychologically liberated the Lebanese people from 
thirty years of servitude. The process of self-liberation began and there was no turning 
back.”102   
After February18, a strong relationship emerged between the Lebanese people 
and the leaders of the Bristol gathering. The result was creation of leadership that was 
dedicated to strategic planning on how to expand the civil resistance.103 
Three days later, Beirut was flooded with some 70,000 demonstrators who carried 
posters proclaiming “Independence ‘05” and “The Truth.”104 On February 26, 
demonstrators built a ‘human chain’ linking Hariri’s assassination site to his burial 
plot.105 The unarmed resistance movement quickly gained momentum and paralyzed the 
state apparatus. “Also at this point, a growing coalition of groups…called for a general 
nationwide strike and mass rally in Martyrs’ Square on 28 February.”106 A social boycott 
was underway. 
The Lebanese government, now anticipating a potential mass demonstration, 
forbade all mass gatherings on February 27, 2005. The head of the Army announced that 
people must stop the insurrection and disperse by the next day. Military and police forces, 
en masse, surrounded Martyrs’ Square and the main roads of Beirut. Checkpoints were 
established. The Lebanese government clearly understood what could happen next. 
Lebanese politicians and people joined forces and challenged the government. 
The nonviolent movement in Beirut was broadcast on TV, which inspired people from all 
over the country to join with demonstrators. The Lebanese people gathered in Martyrs’ 
102 Jaagar and Stephan, Civilian Jihad, 172. 
103 Ibid., 172. 
104 Ibid., 174. 
105 Blanford, Killing Mr. Lebanon, 154. 
106 Jaagar and Stephan, Civilian Jihad, 174. 
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Square and outnumbered army and police forces. The people maintained nonviolent 
discipline and filled the security forces’ gun barrels with flowers.  
Beirut was teeming with demonstrators, who demanded President Lahoud’s 
reassignment and withdrawal of the Syrian troops. On February 28, 2005, Lebanon’s 
government followed the lead of pro-Syrian Sunni leader Umar Karami and stepped 
down.107 
Lebanese Shi’a Muslims initiated peaceful demonstrations after President Bashar 
Assad announced the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. Nonviolent 
demonstrations were mainly organized by groups like Hezbollah and Amal. Hezbollah 
saw the revolutionary opposition defeating the pro-Syrian government and felt it 
necessary to come to its defense.108  
Hezbollah organized meetings on March 8 near Martyrs’ Square, where hundreds 
of thousands of demonstrators expressed support for Syria. At the same time, the 
Hezbollah leadership stated that UN Resolution 1559 was not valid.109 UN Resolution 
1559 demanded free elections and withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.110  
The coalition was surprised by Hezbollah’s demonstration and organized a 
counter demonstration four days later. The coalition insisted on a highly disciplined 
nonviolent demonstration. “Lebanese of all ages, religions, socioeconomic backgrounds, 
and political affiliations poured into Beirut. (Again, however, a Shi’a presence was 
lacking.) No flags were burned, rocks thrown, or clashes with security forces.”111  
The demonstration on March 14, 2005 involved 1.2 million Lebanese.112 It 
demonstrated that the Lebanese people were capable of uniting in order to show their 
107 Zisser, “Lebanon—the Cedar Revolution,” 460. 
108 Jaagar and Stephan, Civilian Jihad, 175. 
109 Ibid. 
110 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1559, “Security Council Declares Support for Free, 
Fair Presidential Election in Lebanon; Calls for Withdrawal of Foreign Forces There,” February 9, 2004, 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8181.doc.htm.  
111 Jaagar and Stephan, Civilian Jihad, 176. 
112 Rita Stephan, “Leadership of Lebanese Women in the Cedar Revolution,” in Muslim Women in 
War and Crisis, ed. Faegheh Shirazi (Austin: University of Texas), 177‒178. 
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grievances to the pro-Syrian government. The last Syrian soldier left Lebanese soil on 
April 26. On May 5, the United Nations confirmed that Lebanon was free from 
occupying forces. Now Lebanon was preparing for its first free elections since 1990.113 
Soon after the end of Syrian occupation, Cedar Revolution coalition members 
began fighting among themselves over political power. Eyal Zisser notes pointedly that 
“…the political forces standing behind the spring 2005 ‘Cedar Revolution’ were not 
made of one cloth….”114 Zisser writes in the same context that the political situation in 
Lebanon after the Cedar Revolution and parliamentary elections stayed basically the 
same.115  
B. ANALYSIS 
A close study of the Cedar Revolution yields several interesting answers as to 
why it succeeded. 
1. Leadership 
Several sect leaders established a short-term political coalition. They managed to 
unite because they shared grievances against the Lebanese government and Syrian 
regime. Despite a decades-long political opposition, resistance leaders were able to unite 
quickly because they were able to use existing channels of communication in religious 
communities. Pre-established sectarian networks helped them unite against a common 
enemy. Jaafar and Stephan note: 
The unpopular extension of Lahoud’s mandate galvanized opposition 
forces and led to the formation of the Committee for the Defense of the 
Constitution and Defense of the Republic, which included the Qornet 
Shehwan coalition, the Jumblat-led Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), the 
Democratic Left Party, and others. The committee, later called the Bristol 
Gathering, after the hotel where leaders met, formed the backbone of an 
opposition that became the driving force [of] the independence intifada.116  
113 Jaagar and Stephan, Civilian Jihad, 176. 
114 Zisser, “Lebanon—the Cedar Revolution,” 464. 
115 Ibid., 482. 
116 Jaagar and Stephan, Civilian Jihad, 171. 
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The sects were never united under one organization and leadership as happened 
during the Cedar Revolution. The think tank La Chamber Noire (the black room) enabled 
opposition leaders to organize, plan and lead strategic-level unarmed civilian 
resistance.117 
The core members of this planning circle, each representing a political 
wing of the opposition, included, in addition to Farroukh, Samir Kassir, a 
leader of the Democratic Left Party, a journalist for al-Nahar, and a 
vehement critic of the Syrian presence in Lebanon; Ziad Majed, another 
leader in the Democratic Left Party; Samir Abdelmalak, a spokesperson 
for the Qornet Shehwan group; and Gibran Tueni, a member of parliament 
and owner of al-Nahar. Others joined the group on an ad-hoc basis, 
including representatives of the FPM (until Michel Aoun’s return from 
exile). This operational corps would play a crucial role in the nonviolent 
struggle..118 
2. High Participation Level 
From 2000 to 2005, Syrian dominance over the Lebanese increased, leading to a 
corresponding increase in civil resistance. In response to increased censorship and arrests 
of opposition members, various Lebanese Christian parties mounted a demonstration in 
August 2001, resulting in mass arrests. At that time, the fragmented Lebanese opposition 
concluded that the key to success was coalition building.119 A year later, the government 
banned MTV [Music Television] broadcasts after interviews with a leading former 
Lebanese army commander, dissident-in-exile Michel Aoun.120 In 2004, the presidential 
election kept people in political turmoil.  
The movement, at its peak in 2005, recorded more than one million 
participants.121 The Lebanese Shi’a Muslims organized counter demonstrations, but 
could not match the opposition’s participation level. Opposition mobilization allowed for 
the occupation of strategic and symbolic public places such as Martyrs’ Square. The 
government and the security forces had been politically outmaneuvered. 
117 Jaagar and Stephan, Civilian Jihad, 172.  
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It is important to note that during the Cedar Revolution, most Lebanese women 
acted like peaceful revolutionary force multipliers. Nora Jumblat, well known in public as 
the wife of Druze leader Walid Jumblat, demonstrated this characteristic when she joined 
with young protesters to conduct a nonviolent march to Martyrs’ Square. She even 
invited the media to broadcast the event.122 Rita Stephan writes, “By openly mingling 
with the men protesting in the streets, by contributing to key aspects of the movements in 
terms of planning, and by organizing their own demonstrations, these women in essence 
added a ‘feminine’ element to resistance.”123  
3. Regime Loyalty Shift 
During the Cedar Revolution, the Lebanese security forces remained neutral.124 
Police and army units had social, sectarian and family ties with the demonstrators. The 
civil resistance gained the sympathy of many members of the security forces. To use 
violence against large numbers of peaceful protesters could be politically too costly. High 
levels of participation reduced the chance that security forces members would engage in 
conflict against their friends and family members.125  
4. Strategy 
The Cedar Revolution leadership utilized clear strategy and strategic planning. 
The strategy included clear achievable demands and creation of a timeline that 
established a sense of urgency among the resistance membership. The civil resistance 
central slogan was “Independence ‘05.” The Lebanese flag and national anthem were 
used to reflect symbolic unity of the resistance movement. The company Quantum 
Communications conducted targeted political communication and marketing on the 
behalf of the civil resistance movement. The student camp at Martyrs’ Square was 
logistically supported by La Chamber Noire. The leadership created a bank account to 
122 Jaagar and Stephan, Civilian Jihad, 171. 
123 Rita Stephan, Muslim Women in War and Crisis, 175. 
124 Erica Chenoweth, “Online Methodological Appendix Accompanying ‘Why Civil Resistance 
Works,’” 110, http://www.ericachenoweth.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/WCRWAppendix-1.pdf. 
125 Jaagar and Stephan, Civilian Jihad, 174.  
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support ongoing resistance.126 The opposition decided to blame the Lebanese and Syrian 
governments for killing Hariri.127  
The strategy featured a diversity of tactics. They included nonviolent protest, 
noncooperation and nonviolent intervention. Demonstrators conducted student strikes and 
walk-outs, gave public speeches, signed public statements, organized political mourning 
and demonstrative funerals, held protest meetings, boycotted legislative bodies, refused 
to accept appointed officials and committed other symbolic public acts. 
5. Organization 
The Cedar Revolution relied on long-established sectarian, anti-Syrian social 
movements and religious organizations. Saleh Farroukh, director-general of the Beirut 
Association for Development, took note of a small working group established in 1988 by 
Hariri, known as La Chamber Noire. This working group “began initiating the general 
plan of the movement,” exploring “how to ensure the continuity of this intifada to reach 
the objective of getting Syria out.”128  
The Cedar Revolution organization was decentralized. It consisted of La Chamber 
Noire and student organizations, which created the Freedom Camp at Martyrs’ Square, 
which was a defining element of the revolution. The students were supported by La 
Chamber Noire and represented all nine political opposition parties.129 
6. Narrative 
Victimization, in the form of Hariri’s assassination, was a main part of the Cedar 
Revolution master narrative. Hariri’s assassination story was a prime example of a well-
narrated story. Everybody knew the bloody history of politically targeted killing in 
Lebanon and everyone had experienced decades of national-level victimization. All this 
made people ready for potential action under emerging leadership.  
126 Jaagar and Stephan, Civilian Jihad, 173‒174. 
127 Blanford, Killing Mr. Lebanon, 142. 
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The Cedar Revolution characterized itself as a victim of Syria’s hegemony in 
Lebanon. Almost everybody, without solid proof, was convinced that “Mr. Lebanon,”130 
Rafig Hariri, had been assassinated by the Lebanese government and devil Syrian regime. 
The assassination of Hariri dramatically advanced the narrative. The people were not 
restrained about expressing their demands. Political posters depicting Hariri’s 
assassination proclaimed “The Truth,” “Independence ‘05,”131 “No to Fear and Yes to 
National Unity,” or “Enough Terrorism our People are Fearless.”132 During a 
demonstration on March 28, Lebanese women declared, “Every mother, every child, and 
every heartbeat asks the same question: Where is the Truth?” “We want love, we want 
peace, and we want truth and freedom.”133  
7. Doctrine  
During the Cedar Revolution, disciplined civil resistance was maintained. How 
was it possible that almost a million demonstrators accepted a nonviolent strategy? The 
key to the largely peaceful demonstrations was the successful implementation of 
nonviolent doctrine, which was well planned and coordinated by the opposition 
leadership, La Chambre Noire. Jaagar and Stephan note that nonviolent activists were 
informed how to conduct tactical-level nonviolent struggle. An example, “Protestors at 
Martyrs’ Square were instructed that in the event of an attempted assault, they should 
immediately sit it tight rows, join arms, and form a human chain to make it more difficult 
for the security forces to carry them away.”134  
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Demonstrators were armed with peaceful messages, so “Men, women, and 
children offered flowers to the soldier, who ignored orders to obstruct the movement of 
the demonstrators on several occasions.”135 The coalition demonstrated their 
understanding of nonviolent doctrine when they decided to use only one symbol for 
resistance, the national flag.136 
One of the opposition leaders, Saleh Farroukh, director-general of the Beirut 
Association for Social Development, clearly recognized the importance of nonviolent 
struggle and discipline. Farroukh stated, “Nowadays, the nonviolent struggle is a very 
important struggle, and a civilized one. [Lebanese] learned from everywhere that 
violence breeds violence…[V]iolence would make the army turn against you…The 
Palestinians lost when they moved from a nonviolent to a violent struggle.”137  
8. Other Factors 
A number of lesser factors were nonetheless important to the success of the Cedar 
Revolution. 
Political Opportunity 
The death of Syrian President Hāfiz Assad in 2000 weakened the central power 
and created the political opportunity for mobilization and resistance in Lebanon. Bashar 
al Assad, Hāfiz’s son, lacked authority even among his own subordinates.138 Another 
external political factor was UN Resolution 1559, which put Syria’s regime in 2004 
under international political pressure. It called for free elections and the withdrawal of all 
foreign forces from Lebanon.139 According to the resolution, Syria’s military was an 
occupying force.  
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Technology and Media 
The Cedar Revolution made use of mobile phones, text messages and the Internet 
as key communication tools to accelerate civil resistance mobilization.140 Multiple 
Lebanese and international TV channels, such as CNN, aired the revolution in real time. 
Jaafar and Stephan note that technology allowed for the movement to create coalitions 
and gain international support.141 Jaafar and Stephan describe how the political 
communication company Quantum Communications, led by Eli Khoury, was marketing 
and messaging news during the revolution.142 It was quite clear that whoever owned the 
media “owned” the events of revolution and controlled the narrative and messages. Jaafar 
and Stephan quote Khoury, “If you win the heart of the media and the heart of the 
international community, you will win the war. We suffered in the past when we had 
large numbers of the people demonstrating but failed to win international hearts and 
minds.”143 
Internal Financing 
Revolutionary activities, violent or nonviolent, need financial assets. The Cedar 
Revolution was no exception. It was financed largely by Hariri’s family, specifically the 
Beirut Association for Social Development. It bought flags and other necessities. 
Lebanese people and rich businessmen also donated money, often anonymously.144 Rudy 
Jaagar and Maria J. Stephan note, “In addition to the financial and logistical support from 
the working group, the tent city was sustained thanks to the generous contributions of 
thousands of ordinary Lebanese who deposited money into an account set up in the 
Lebanese Saradar Bank.”145 
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C. SUMMARY 
Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan classified the Cedar Revolution as 
successful.146 In addition, the Cedar Revolution meets the requirements for full success 
described by Gene Sharp. He defines full success as meaning that all or most of the goals 
during or soon after the nonviolent struggle have been achieved.147 
The Cedar Revolution is a great example of successful civil resistance, where 
organizers and participants recognized and took advantage of emerging external and 
internal political opportunities by mobilizing a broad set of existing networks and 
constructing a nationalist narrative against Syrian influence in Lebanon. Moreover, 
nonviolent strategy and tactics were used to maintain the movement’s legitimacy and 
popular support. 
  
146 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 234. 
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IV. THE SINGING REVOLUTION IN ESTONIA, 1987‒1991 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Estonian Singing Revolution (1988‒1991) is an example of a successful civil 
resistance secession campaign. Four years of well-organized peaceful and continuous 
nonviolent struggle at the national level by various political and social actors paved the 
road for Estonian sovereignty in 1991.  
1. Significance of the Case  
What makes the Singing Revolution remarkable is that Estonians managed to 
continuously wage a four-year, nonviolent campaign. It takes its name from the Estonian 
people’s love of group singing. Though patriotic songs were banned during Soviet 
occupation, participants sang their feelings in a language the Soviets did not understand. 
Indrek Toome, Secretary of the Central Ideology Committee of the Estonian Communist 
Party, states that, “Singing was our secret language…this secret language was 
nonexistent in Russia.”148  
2. Synopsis 
In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev was appointed to lead the Soviet Union. According 
to an Estonian encyclopedia, Gorbachev’s “Perestroika (restructuring) meant reforms in 
the political and economic system. …Glasnost (transparency) meant more public 
information, for example about topical issues, background to political decisions, and 
mistakes made in the past.”149  
The First Estonian civil movement, the so-called Phosphorus War, was triggered 
on February 25, 1987, when people watched shocking news from the popular Soviet TV 
show “Panda.” It revealed Moscow’s plan to further develop new phosphorus mines in 
148 Indrek Toome, “Usutlus Indrek Toomega,”[ Indrek Toome Interview] in Eestimaa Laul 88, [The 
Song of Estonia 88] ed. Elme Väljaste and Enno Selirand, translated by Margus Kuul (Tallinn: MTÜ 
Eestimaa Laul, 2011), 217. 
149 Estonica, Encyclopedia about Estonia, “Perestroika and Glasnost,” 
http://www.estonica.org/en/Perestroika_and_glasnost/. 
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Estonia and to import tens of thousands of Russian-speaking workers.150 In response, the 
Estonians launched nine months of disobedience against the parliament, the Supreme 
Soviet of Estonia. Armed resistance was never considered.151 The Estonians hoped to 
protect their environment and avoid the arrival of a new wave of Russian-speaking 
workers. 
On May 14, during a traditional music concert, a new song, “Ei ole üksi üksi 
maa” (No Land is Alone), composed by Alo Mattiissen, was sung by various popular 
singers. It turned the event into part of the ongoing Phosphorus War campaign. 
Mattiissen’s song was banned.152 The media published anti-mining articles despite 
regime censorship. After nine months, the Estonia Communist Party gave up on the 
mining plan.153 But by then, Estonians had learned the value of protest and had lost some 
of their fear of the KGB. 
On August 23, 1987, the “Estonian Group on Publication of the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact (Estonian abbreviation MRP-AEG)” organized a mass demonstration in 
Tallinn, demanding that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, including its secret annexation 
protocols, should be revealed.”154 A week later, the Estonian Communist Party banned 
all mass demonstrations. Government propaganda declared that the masterminds behind 
the anti-Soviet event were the radio stations “Voice of America,” “Radio Free Europe,” 
and “Freedom” and a small cell of former enemies of the state, led by Tiit Madisson.155  
150 Rein Ruutsoo, “Tagasivaateid Vabaduse Teele ̋ - Eestimaa Rahvarinde Roll Eesti Ajaloos 1988‒
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History 1988‒1993], in Rahva Rinne 1988: Kakskümmend Aastat Hiljem,[The Popular Front 1988‒
Twenthy Years Later], translated by Margus Kuul (Tallinn: Tallinna Raamatutrükikoda, 2008), 253‒254. 
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152 Mart Laar, Urmas Ott, and Sirje Endre, “Fosforiidisõda 1987,” [The Phosphorus War 1987] in 
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1986–1991] translated by Margus Kuul, eds. Elle Veermäe, Leila Lehtmets, Kristiina Märtin (Tallinn: 
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On January 28, communist leaders in the Supreme Soviet of Estonia changed 
regulations in order to maintain control over civil disobedience and potential 
demonstrations. Now, unless approved, civil demonstrations were banned.156 Some 
weeks later, during the Estonian Communist Party (ECP) main meeting, the 
announcement was made that the ongoing civil unarmed insurrections were initiated by 
the United States of America.157  
On December 24, an anti-U.S. demonstration took place in the capital city of 
Tallinn, organized by the Estonian Communist Party. The demonstrators were mainly 
Russian workers and various Estonian communists. The demonstration was backed by the 
media. Just days before, the ECP had established “anti-propaganda groups.” On the same 
day, the Estonian Group on Publication of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact also held 
successful demonstrations.158  
According to Laberpetz, the April 1988 meeting of the Conference of Artists’ and 
Scientists’ Union was the beginning of a new era.159 Estonian intelligentsia gathered in 
the Supreme Soviet of Estonia in Toompea and launched a massive critique against the 
ruling regime.160 This event was a catastrophe for local communist leaders and marked 
the weakening of the regime. 
On April 13, during the TV show “Mõtleme Veel” (“Let’s Think Again”), 
emerging leader Edgar Savisaar made a proposition to create a civil movement. Savisaar 
named it the Popular Front. The idea behind it was simple. The Popular Front would 
support Gorbachev’s policies.161  
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In 1988, the Estonians began mass political mobilization, but oddly, the youth 
remained mostly bystanders. For them, the Popular Front was not popular at all because 
of its official cooperation with the communists.162 Everything changed, however, in the 
summer of 1988. When the youth gathered on June 4 for traditional Old Town Days in 
the capital of Tallinn, a student plenum was held, followed by a nonviolent raid.163 
Thousands of young people looking for action hoisted the Estonian flag and fought back 
the police efforts to confiscate it. Then they marched to the song festival fairground to 
sing. They agreed to return every evening until the end of Old Town Days.164 Vesilind 
wrote that the crowd grew each night and soon there were 100,000 people singing 
patriotic songs. It was the beginning of the Singing Revolution.165  
Karl Vaino, the head of the Estonian Communist Party, was in a panic and 
requested that Moscow send extra troops to suppress the “uprising.” The request was not 
granted.166 The Soviet Estonian Ministry of Interior had plenty of manpower and was 
able to mobilize 10,000 soldiers and triple the size of the security force on short 
notice.167  
On September 11, the Popular Front along with other movements organized “The 
Song of Estonia 88,” which was held in Tallinn at the Song Festival shell. This 
essentially was like a Popular Front “autumn offensive,”168 which mobilized 250,000‒
300,000 people at the site.169  
162 Laar, Ott, and Endre, Teine Eesti, 349. 
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Eestimaa Laul 88: Kõned, Fotod, Meenutused, CD, [The Song of Estonia 88:Speeches, Photos and 
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The Popular Front was established officially in October during the first Popular 
Front Founding Congress.170 It was the first time the Popular Front had shown its real 
capability and outreach to the public and the Communist Party. Donations made by 
organizations and companies totaled 80,904 rubles, while donations from the public 
amounted to 162,271 rubles.171  
On November 16, 1988, the legislative body of Estonia issued the Sovereignty 
Declaration.172 This event marked the start of the collapse of Soviet Union.173 The 
Popular Front, The Green Movement and The Heritage Society united and collected 
almost 900,000 signatures that were addressed to the Supreme Soviet of Estonia and the 
Supreme Soviet Union to show opposition to Moscow’s attempt to change the Soviet 
constitution in a way that would make it more difficult for Soviet republics, such as 
Estonia, to change their own laws.174  
The year 1989 was full of political events, including elections. A couple of 
months before the elections, on January 18, the Supreme Soviet of Estonia declared 
Estonian the official language. On February 24, the Estonian flag was hoisted on the 
tower of Long Hermann, the parliament.175  
Russians living in Estonia were upset by the changes. In the first week of March, 
the “First Congress of Inter Front” was held. The main speaker, Jyri Rudjak, aggressively 
opposed sovereignty for Estonia. Soon after, nonviolent demonstrations were held in 
different cities in Estonia, including Tallinn, where 30,000 Russians demanded 
annulment of the Language Act or the Inter Front would propose the separation of 
Northeast Estonia.176  
170 Ruutsoo, Rahvarinne 1988, 274. 
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On March 26, the Popular Front won the Supreme Soviet of Estonia elections. 
The Popular Front achieved a strategic political victory over the Inter Front on March 26, 
1989, winning 27 seats out of 37 during elections for the Congress of People’s Deputies 
of the Soviet Union. The Estonian communists and The Popular Front worked together 
against Inter Front.177  
A peaceful mass demonstration, known as a Baltic Chain, occurred on August 23, 
1989, in Estonia and other Baltic States with 2 million participants.178 In the autumn of 
1989, people started to voluntarily withdraw from the Estonian Communist Party.179 On 
September 15, 1989, the Inter Front copied the Baltic Chain activity. On November 16, it 
organized a meeting with 30,000 demonstrators and demanded autonomy for Northeast 
Estonia.180  
In 1990, numerous political events paved the road to Estonian independence. The 
Popular Front and Savisaar, despite opposition from the other parties, managed to achieve 
full political power. Anatol Lieven notes that “almost 70 percent of the deputies elected 
to the Estonian Supreme Council in March 1990 belonged to the Popular Front…”181  
Democratic elections to the Supreme Soviet of Estonia were held on March 18. 
The Popular Front won 44 seats out of 105.182 Now, the official majority was making 
rapid changes. On May 8, the supreme council officially declared the formation of the 
Estonia Republic and rejected all official symbols of the former Soviet Estonia.183 The 
head of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev, declared the Soviet Estonia decision invalid. The 
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next day the Inter Front, inspired by the Gorbachev decision, stormed the Supreme 
Council.184  
Immediately, Estonians gathered in Toompea and with nonviolent action forced 
the Inter Front demonstrators out. Marju Lauristin states, “For me, this was a real symbol 
of Estonian-style politics: keeping it calm but getting your objectives, your aims, 
fulfilled. It was a major victory that we didn’t have any blood. Not a drop.”185  
Finally, after years of multifaceted nonviolent struggle in the Soviet Union, the 
communist system began to feel the paralyzing effect of unarmed insurrection.  
On August 20, 1991, the Estonian Supreme Council officially restored the 
Republic of Estonia. The next day, Soviet troops were sent to Estonia to maintain control 
because of an attempted coup d’état in Moscow. The Soviet military stormed the Tallinn 
TV tower on August 21, but they could not interrupt radio broadcasts because Estonians 
had organized a human shield and blocked the doors. On August 24, Boris Yeltsin, the 
new leader of the Russian Republic, officially recognized the Republic of Estonia.186 The 
Soviet leaders had few options. Official recognition of the Republic of Estonia was the 
best option available because at the same time the Soviets had an ongoing coup d’état 
attempt in Moscow. 
B. ANALYSIS 
The success of the Singing Revolution can be attributed to several factors. 
1. Leadership 
The Singing Revolution’s leadership can be characterized as charismatic and 
decentralized. It had numerous popular leaders. Most of them were intellectuals, artists, 
journalists, academics, and musicians. The Popular Front’s top political leader, Edgar 
Savisaar, was a career communist. Another key leader, Marju Lauristin, was a professor 
at Tartu University. Both of them represented pro-communist political views. 
184 Laar, Ott, and Endre, Teine Eesti, 688. 
185 Vesilind, The Singing Revolution, 146‒147. 
186 Ruutsoo, Rahvarinne 1988, 310‒314. 
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Rein Ruutsoo states that the presence of homegrown communists among the 
Popular Front leadership allowed it to infiltrate the Communist Party’s most critical 
powerbase.187 The leaders’ ability to cooperate with different movements allowed the 
Popular Front to deeply penetrate Estonian society and take over already established 
networks and influence other opposition civil organizations and cells.188 By 1988, the 
Popular Front support cells had been created inside many government institutions. For 
example, the first support cell was established in the transportation association, Tallinna 
Autoveod, where it took advantage of pre-established official networks to support 
Popular Front activities. Quickly, over 300 similar support cells were created in 
numerous official institutions all over Estonia with 13,000 members.189 
Heritage Society leaders Trivimi Velliste and Mart Laar represented moderate 
views while Estonian Independence Party (ENIP) leaders Tunne Kelam, Heiki Ahonen 
and Tiit Madison represented radical political views. Velliste supported “‘The Hungarian 
path’” as the immediate objective, a “‘socialist’ Estonia outside the Soviet Union.”190 
ENIP leaders directly challenged and demanded the end of the Soviet occupation.191  
The Heritage Society, and especially the Estonian Independence Party leadership, 
comprised direct political opposition to the ECP. It is noteworthy that despite different 
political views and goals, the Popular Front, the Heritage Society and ENIP leadership 
emphasized strategic civil resistance.  
  
187 Ruutsoo, Rahvarinne 1988, 36. 
188 Edgar Savisaar’s speech clearly recognizes this assumption. Savisaar stated during the First 
Popular Front Congress that 28 percent of Popular Front attorneys belong to Estonian Communist Party, 19 
percent are members of the Heritage Society, 10 percent are involved with Green Movement, 2 percent are 
involved with religion unions and 0.2 percent with ERSP [Estonian National Independence Party] and 
MRP-AEG [Estonian Group on Publication of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact]. Ninety-one percent of 
Popular Front activists are Estonians, over 6 percent are Russians and over 2 percent are other people from 
various nations. The Popular Front was made up of urban laborers, 25 percent; rural laborers, 5.6 percent; 
production workers, 18.4 percent; and others, 35.8 percent. Edgar Savisaar, Rahvarinne 1988, 26‒27. 
189 Laar, Ott, and Endre, Teine Eesti, 343. 
190 Rein Taagepera, “A Note on the March 1989 Elections in Estonia,” Soviet Studies 42, no.2 (April 
1990): 334, http://www.jstor.org/stable/152084. 
191 Ibid., 335.  
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Musicians like Alo Mattiissen and other celebrities represented Estonian cultural 
leadership and helped to mobilize and transmit the political leaders’ messages in public. 
Song festivals and concerts initiated by celebrities during the Singing Revolution played 
an important part of political mobilization and the marketing of prohibited national colors 
and symbols.  
2. High Participation Level 
Participation in the Singing Revolution was very high. Hundreds of thousands of 
people were involved in mass demonstrations. High commitment is partly explained 
through pre-established social networks, which managed to initiate visible political 
action. According to Johnston and Snow, the Estonian nationalist oppositional subculture 
“formed the basis for mass mobilization of the independence movement in the late 
1980s.”192 As an example, they cited “…local theater troupes, scholar societies, local 
history associations, bee-keeping, and horticultural societies in rural areas, and small 
intellectual groups like the English Academic Association and Book Lovers.”193 
Intellectuals had access to political mobilization resources through official social 
networks. 
The Phosphorus War in the spring of 1987 was initiated by Estonian intellectuals 
who worked in government agencies. For example, an official resentment letter against 
future mining was written by The Estonian Lawyers Association and Teachers 
Association. The Academy of Sciences of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic released 
a public anti-mining appeal. The Board of Tartu University approved the decision to 
oppose future phosphorus mining on April 24, 1987. As a result, the May 1 parade, 
organized for traditional Soviet Union glorification in Tartu, was a total failure. Students 
grabbed the initiative and launched an anti-mining protest instead.194  
192 Hank Johnston and David A. Snow, “Subcultures and the Emerge of the Estonian Nationalist 
Opposition 1945‒1990,” Sociological Perspective 41, no.3 (1998): 479, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3435987. 
193 Ibid., 483‒484.  
194 Laar, Ott, and Endre, Teine Eesti, 159‒161. 
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Participation grew on June 14, 1988, the Day of Deportation,195 when 
demonstrations occurred all over Estonia, as well as in neighboring Baltic States.196  
The idea of creating the Popular Front also triggered people to start mobilizing. 
The Popular Front grew rapidly. By early June 1988, it had 883 support cells and 
approximately 50,000 members. Popular Front leaders came up with the idea of a mass 
demonstration and were inspired by the events of the song festival grounds.197 By the end 
of July 1988, more than 1,100 cells had been established.198  
Peter Hayes notes that by June 20, the Soviet Republic of Estonia had officially 
recognized the Peoples Front, a 40,000-member nationalist organization. Hayes wrote, 
“The recognition is the first for a large noncommunist political group in the Soviet 
Union.”199  
A peaceful demonstration, known as a Baltic Chain, occurred on August 23, 1989. 
The event, which embraced the Baltic States, was initiated by Savisaar. It was held on the 
fiftieth anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Approximately 300,000‒400,000 
Estonians joined hands in a human chain that included over two million people all 
throughout the Baltic States. People were inspired by the song “The Baltics Are Waking 
Up! Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia….”200  
While Estonian nationalism was rising, the reach of the Soviet political power 
was falling. The KGB vanguard lost control over the Estonian people. Under Glasnost, 
Moscow made some critical contributions to the campaign’s success. Without fear of 
repression and coercion, Estonians started national-level political mass mobilization. 
195Estonica, Encyclopedia About Estonia, “The June deportation is the term denoting the forceful 
deportation of about 10,000 people from Estonia to Russia on 14 June, 1941 by the Soviet regime,” 
http://www.estonica.org/en/The_June_deportation,_1941/. 
196 Laar, Ott, and Endre, Teine Eesti, 356. 
197 Laar, Ott, and Endre, Teine Eesti, 393.  
198 Ibid., 343.  
199 Peter Hayes, “Chronology 1988,” Foreign Affairs 68, no. 1, America and the World 1988/89 
(1988/1989): 230, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20043893.  
200 Laar, Ott, and Endre, Teine Eesti, 580‒581. 
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This, in turn, raised the level of civil resistance participation and demonstrated the 
people’s desire for change.  
3. Regime Loyalty Shift 
Chenoweth claims that the Singing Revolution in 1989 showed no loyalty shift.201 
One did take place, however, starting in 1988 and continuing through 1991. 
The Popular Front was officially supported by the ECP after party leader Karl 
Vaino was deposed in 1988. The new ECP leader, Vaino Väljas, officially supported the 
goals, which were written in the manifest of the Popular Front.202 For instance, on 
February 23, 1990 the Supreme Soviet of Estonia revoked the portion of the Soviet 
Estonian constitution reaffirming the Communist Party’s leading role. Soon after, 75,000 
people out of 110,000 left the party.203 The ECP disintegrated. 
It is noteworthy, however, that Moscow authorized peaceful transference of 
security responsibility on March 1, 1991. Soviet Minister of Interior Vadim Bakunin 
signed the agreement and the Estonian Miilits (Police) was given control under the 
Estonian government.204 One of the important pillars of political power had been 
peacefully shifted to Estonians. 
The Singing Revolution also offers good examples of third-party support. In 
1991, Moscow was paralyzed by local Russian civil movements. The regime witnessed 
internal loyalty shifts. Three hundred enterprises in Leningrad declared support and 
launched strikes supporting the Baltic countries.205  
  
201Erica Chenoweth, “Online Methodological Appendix Accompanying, ‘Why Civil Resistance 
Works,’” 74, http://www.ericachenoweth.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/WCRWAppendix-1.pdf. 
202 Ruutsoo, Rahvarinne 1988, 274‒275. 
203 Ibid., 290. 
204 Ibid., 304. 
205 Ibid., 302. 
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Four days later, approximately 300,000 Russians launched a peaceful 
demonstration in the heart of the empire, in Moscow at the Kremlin, in support of the 
Baltics.206 Gorbachev promised Arnold Rüütel, the head of Soviet Estonia, that he would 
not use military force in Estonia.207 Despite the promises, the military was involved in a 
failed attempt to control Estonia. The conflict ended without casualties. 
4. Strategy 
The Estonian Singing Revolution leadership successfully utilized a predominantly 
nonviolent resistance strategy. To politically mobilize the people, the leadership of The 
Popular Front, the Heritage Society and ENIP focused on themes such as Gorbachev’s 
perestroika, protection of the Estonian culture and language, and Soviet crimes against 
humanity in Estonia.  
Philip Roeder points out those political entrepreneurs could use two strategies: the 
“primordial and instrumental”208 or a mixture of the two strategies.209 The Estonians had 
used a hybrid nonviolent strategy for mobilizing people during the Phosphorus War by 
combining ethnic and environmental issues and goals under one banner. 
The most effective civil resistance strategy was formulated by the Popular Front, 
which led to the takeover of political power in Estonia in 1990. The strategy was guided 
by the Soviet Estonian Constitution and its goals were disclosed publicly in the manifesto 
published in the newspaper Edasi. The core of the strategy was to establish support cells 
in existing work places, clubs, religious congregations, schools and other places. The 
206 Patricia Lee Droff, “Chronology 1991,” Foreign Affairs 71, no. 1 America and the World 1991/92 
(1991/1992): 196, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20045117. 
207 Ruutsoo, Rahvarinne 1988, 303. 
208 Roeder notes in his study: “The primordial strategy focuses on ethnic revival—in Smith’s words, 
‘communal regeneration through self-discovery and self-realization.’ The mobilization of the ethnic 
community for political action often centers on an assertion of the ethnic group’s identity, usually in the 
context of issues of culture, identity, or belief and in reaction to threats to the identity from assimilative 
policies. The instrumental strategy focuses on the pursuit of social and economic interests.” Philip G. 
Roeder, “Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization,” World Politics 43, no. 2 (January 1991): 203, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010471. 
209 Ibid., 203. 
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Popular Front Harta declared using persuasion and, if needed, civil resistance to achieve 
goals.210  
Part of the Popular Front strategy was to take the leading role in the communist 
Estonian Supreme Council, the only official body in Estonia recognized by the Soviets. 
The goal was to democratize the Supreme Council and negotiate with Moscow.211 The 
ultimate goal was economic and political sovereignty. The Popular Front took the leading 
role in the Self-Managing economic program (the Estonian abbreviation is IME, which 
means ‘miracle’) which was worked out in September 1987 by a group of Estonian 
economists. The program showed that the Estonian economy could survive 
independently. One of the perestroika-era arguments for keeping the Soviet Union whole 
was the claim that the republics within the union could not manage on their own. IME 
emphasized the opposite.212  
The Popular Front strategy was supported by the ECP and rapidly grew its 
membership, which allowed it to maintain a mainstream position until the end of the 
Singing Revolution. In addition, part of the Popular Front’s strategy included cooperation 
with Russians living in Estonia. The message was that the movement represents all 
people regardless of nationality.213 
Conversely, The Heritage Society and ENIP strategy did not include cooperation 
with the ECP. Their strategy was to establish an alternative legislative body. On 
December 24, 1989, the ENIP and the Heritage Society decided to run their own political 
campaigns to form an Estonian congress. According to Tunne Kelam, the mastermind 
210 Rein Ruutsoo, Rahvarinne website. “Eestimaa Rahvarinde Põhidokument (Rahvarinde Harta),” 
[The Charter of the Popular Front], 
http://www.rahvarinne.ee/public_uploads/files/101/1._september_1988_-
_Rahvarinde_pohidokument,_Rahvarinde_harta.jpg. 
211 Kadri Simson, “Kommentaarid II Kongressi Kõnedele’” ‒ Eesti Rahvarinde Roll Ajaloos 1988‒
1993,” [Comments to Speeches during the Second Congress ‒ The Role of the Popular Front in Estonian 
History 1988‒1993] in Rahvarinne 1988: Kakskümmend Aastat Hiljem, [The Popular Front 1988‒Twenty 
Years Later], translated by Margus Kuul, ed. by Aire Veskimäe (Tallinn: Tallinna Raamatutrükikoda, 
2008), 61. 
212 Estonica, Encyclopedia about Estonia, “Self Managing Estonia,” http://www.estonica.org/en/Self-
Managing_Estonia/. 
213 Simson, “Kommentaarid II Kongressi Kõnedele,’” 64. 
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behind the Estonian congress, the idea “presents a genuine alternative to the illegal Soviet 
structure.”214 Part of their strategy was the creation of Citizens’ Committee Movements. 
In February 1989, The Heritage Foundation and ENIP started a unique 
mass initiative known as “Citizens’ Committee Movements.” In one year, 
local citizens’ committees had signed up 860,000 Estonians—including 
refugees and their dependents around the world—who had declared that 
they were citizens of the original Estonia, not part of the Soviet Union.215 
On October 29, the Citizens’ Committee Movements had 314,521 members in 
111 cells. Additional cells were established in Paris, Stockholm and Moscow.216 
On January 26, 1990, the Estonian intelligentsia published a collective statement 
in which they recognized the Estonian Congress and declared the Supreme Soviet of 
Estonia as void.217 This statement forced the Popular Front to cooperate with the 
Estonian Congress. On February 24, elections were held for the Estonian Congress, and 
in March 1990, Congress established a legislative body without any official power.218 
Moscow refused to negotiate with the Estonian Congress.219 Their strategy was not 
successful.  
Meanwhile the Popular Front was carrying out its strategy through a variety of 
methods of nonviolent resistance, which included collective singing. Gene Sharp notes 
that “under some conditions, singing may constitute a method of nonviolent protest…”220 
The Popular Front organized activities to include collective patriotic singing in public 
places, civil appeals, mass demonstrations and gatherings, public declarations, 
agreements, negotiations, high level use of mass media, marketing, using symbols such as 
214 Vesilind, The Singing Revolution, 144.  
215 Vesilind, The Singing Revolution, 139‒143.  
216 Laar, Ott, and Endre, Teine Eesti, 630. 
217 Ibid., 643. 
218 Vesilind, The Singing Revolution, 144‒145.  
219 Simson, “Kommentaarid II Kongressi Kõnedele,’” 63. 
220 Gene Sharp, “The Methods of Nonviolent Protest and Persuasion,” in The Politics of Nonviolent 
Action: the Methods of Nonviolent Action. Part Two. ed. Marina Finkelstein (Boston: Porter Sargent 
Publishers, 1998), 149. 
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flags, posters, and leaflets. These demonstrated the civil resistance leadership’s 
understanding of nonviolent conflict doctrine and strategic-level planning.  
5. Organization 
The Singing Revolution case study shows the importance of strong and well-
organized grassroots-level civil resistance. The Popular Front, The Heritage Society and 
The Estonian Independence Party, the three main players in the Singing Revolution, 
made use of established social networks and umbrella organizations. During the summer 
of 1987, civil social movements mushroomed and established networks. The communist 
regime had created favorable conditions for these organizations because of perestroika 
and glasnost. When the political opportunity was available, established networks, clubs 
and social networks immediately transformed themselves into more formal organizations.  
The Heritage Society 
The Heritage Society was formed from the book club “Tõru.”221 In 1987, the 
Heritage movement grew quickly until it consisted of over a “thousand members in 31 
different clubs.”222 A couple of months later, in early autumn, The Heritage Society 
included 62 clubs and 2,259 members.223 Taagepera notes that at the beginning of 1989 
the movement had 10,000 members, “including Russian, Jewish and Armenian 
chapters.”224 The Estonian Heritage Society was officially established on December 12, 
1987.225 The organization was culture-oriented and represented national political views. 
221 According to Trivimi Velliste: book club “Tõru” was established on December 30, 1974. The main 
hidden goal of the social club was researching Estonian history. In ten years, club members made more 
than “two hundred” presentations at the meetings. The Club’s real activity kept a low profile and club 
members were secretly chosen. In 1986, at gatherings in Jüri Church and 1987 in Tallinn and Keila, The 
Heritage Society revealed its goals to protect the history, monuments and culture of Estonians. Members of 
The Heritage Society started to clean up and renovate neglected monuments, church gardens with help of 
local peoples. Trivimi Velliste, “Vastused Mart Laari küsimustele faksi teel New Yorgist 29. Mail 1996.” 
[Trivimi Velliste Answers to Mart Laar Questions via telefax from New York on 29 May 1996.”] in Teine 
Eesti: Eesti Iseseisvuse Taassünd 1986‒1991. [Another Estonia: The Rebirth of Independent Estonia, 
1986–1991”], ed. by Elle Veermäe, Leila lehtmets, Kristiina Märtin. (Tallinn: SE&JS, 1996), 312‒335. 
222 Ibid., 194.  
223 Ibid., 197. 
224 Rein Taagepera, “A Note on the March 1989 Elections in Estonia,” Soviet Studies 42, no.2 (April 
1990): 334, http://www.jstor.org/stable/152084.  
225 Ruutsoo, Rahvarinne 1988, 259. 
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The Popular Front 
The Popular Front, after its establishment in 1989, used local social networks and 
took advantage of its position within the Communist Party. For example, on May 23, 
1988, the environmental organization “Roheliste Liikumine” (Green Movement) was 
established.226 Later, the Greens Movement linked up with the Popular Front creating 
more local chapters and improved social networks. In 1989, organization had around 
6,000 members.227 The Popular Front took advantage of pre-established Green 
Movement social networks.  
According to Johnston and Aarelait-Tart, moderate autonomists formed the 
Popular Front of Estonia (PFE) in 1988. “The front mobilized rapidly by using Soviet 
infrastructure and resources, such as trade union organizations. It was broad-based, 
reformist, and widely supported by the intellectuals—a significant element in the PFE’s 
success.”228 For example, the Popular Front established a working group within the 
production association known as Estoplast. In 1988, 1,000 Estoplast members took part 
in “The Song of Estonia 88”event.229 In 1988, the Popular Front Congress was held in 
the concert venue in Tallinn, hosting thousands of people.230 
The Popular Front gained strong support at the grassroots level. For example, 
regional farming collective construction offices, schools, and cooperatives all supported 
the Popular Front activities and organized support cells. Taagepera notes that the Popular 
Front had “the total informal membership of about 100,000 rivals to the CPE 
226 Laar, Ott, and Endre, Teine Eesti, 343.  
227 Taagepera, “A Note on the March 1989 Elections in Estonia,” 334. 
228 Hank Johnston and Aili Aarelaid-Tart, “Generations, Microcohorts, and Long-Term Mobilization: 
The Estonians National Movement, 1940‒1991,” Sociological Perspectives 43.no.4 (Winter 2000):689‒
690, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1389553. 
229 Ülo Nugis, “Usutlus Ülo Nugisega,” [Ülo Nugis Interview] in Eestimaa Laul 88, [Song Of Estonia 
88] ed. Elme Väljaste and Enno Selirand (Tallinn: MTÜ Eestimaa Laul, 2011), 219. 
230 Edgar Savisaar, “Rahvarinde I Kongress 1. Oktoobeer 1988.a’” ‒ Eesti Rahvarinde Roll Ajaloos 
1988‒1993,” [The Congress of the Popular Front on October 1, 1988 ‒ The Role of the Popular Front in 
Estonian History 1988‒1993] in Rahvarinne 1988: Kakskümmend Aastat Hiljem [The Popular Front 1988‒
Twenty Years Later], (Tallinn: Tallinna Raamatutrükikoda, 2008), 22‒31. 
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[Communist Party of Estonia] (110,000), with an overlapping membership of about 
25,000.”231  
The Estonian National Independence Party 
The Estonian National Independence Party (ENIP) was established “on the basis 
of a pre-existing organization and had in early 1989 about 300-card-carrying 
members.”232 ENIP emerged from The Estonian Group on Publication of the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact and represented the radical side of the opposition movement. Johnston 
and Aarelait-Tart state that radical restorationists, dissidents and non-communists from 
the Stalin era carried “the pure Estonian collective action frame.”233 The ENIP, unlike 
the Popular Front, did not cooperate with communists and therefore was not able to 
access the same political mobilization resources as the Popular Front. 
It must be noted that the Popular Front, ENIP and The Heritage Society were able 
to cooperate despite very different political views. A conflict emerged, however, on 
February 24, 1989, when the Estonian flag was hoisted on the tower of Long Hermann, 
the parliament.234 The flag-hoisting event was initiated and organized by The Heritage 
Society. The Popular Front strongly opposed the event. This led to clear friction.235 The 
Popular Front’s primary goal was not to establish Estonian independence. The goal was 
political and economic sovereignty as a Soviet state and not as an independent country, 
which was contrary to the wishes of the ENIP (Estonian National Independence Party).  
6. Narrative 
The master narrative during the Singing Revolution involved national 
victimization and targeted vilification based on historical animosities. The narrative 
included stories about endangerment of the Estonian language and culture. Estonians 
231 Taagepera, “A Note on the March 1989 Elections in Estonia,” 333. 
232 Ibid., 335. 
233 Johnston and Aarelaid-Tart, “Generations, Microcohorts, and Long-Term Mobilization: The 
Estonian National Movement, 1940‒1991,” 690. 
234Ruutsoo, Rahvarinne 1988, 277. 
235 Laar, Ott, and Endre, Teine Eesti, 558. 
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were victims of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany’s Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its 
secret protocols, which resulted in the Soviet occupation in 1940. Another theme was the 
coercive Russification and vilification of patriotic Estonians and dissidents, such as Lagle 
Parek, Tiit Madisson and many others.  
By the mid-1980s, Estonia had been occupied by the Soviets for 40 years. People 
at every social level, especially the intelligentsia, used to walk “fist in their pocket”236 as 
a sign of passive resistance. The Estonians’ collective memory was full of grievances. 
Three generations of Estonians remembered Soviet occupation and coercive mass 
deportation in 1941 as well as armed resistance conducted by the Forest Brothers. The 
master narrative included the desire for social change and independence, which mobilized 
the people; therefore, the movements did not have recruitment problems. In addition, 
Estonians experienced daily coercive Russification and had witnessed imprisonment of 
political dissidents. Estonians felt that the nation and the Estonian identity were at risk 
because of Russian-speaking laborers’ mass immigration. 
7. Doctrine 
The Singing Revolution had remarkable nonviolent discipline. Not a single mass 
gathering turned to violence over four years. In 1991, Defense Minister Raivo Vare 
ordered the legislature to rely only on civil resistance when dealing with revolutionary 
Russians in case of occupation.237 Vare notes, “The resistance that we planned in 1991 
and organized through communications with other Estonian towns and cities was to a 
remarkable extent based on your [Gene Sharp] book, Civilian-Based Defense.”238 People 
were prepared for civil resistance. Gene Sharp notes, “In well-prepared campaigns, clear 
236 Raimond Kaljulaid, “Eessõna: Rusikas Taskus” [The Fist in the Pocket] in Rahvarinne 1988: 
Kakskümmend Aastat Hiljem [The Popular Front 1988‒Twenty Years Later ], (Tallinn: Tallinna 
Raamatutrükikoda, 2008), 13. 
237Bruce Jenkins, “Civilian-Based Defense Discussed in Moscow and Baltics,” in Nonviolent 
Sanctions: News from The Albert Einstein Institution, III, no. 3 (Winter 1991/92): 5, 8. 
238 The Albert Einstein Institution, in Report of Activities 2000‒2004 (Boston: Pride Printers), 13.  
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instructions will be issued to the general population and to particular groups that are 
asked to carry out specific acts of resistance and defiance in disciplined ways.”239  
In 1991, the newspaper “Rahva Hääl” produced “Ten Points of Civil 
Disobedience,”240 and provided guidance on how to act in case of occupation.241 
According to Bruce Jenkins, Estonians planned for nonviolent struggle at the strategic 
level.242 This strategic activity during the Singing Revolution was a direct outcome of 
Sharp’s lectures in 1989 in Moscow.243  
8. Other Factors 
Certain other factors are worthy of consideration for their effects on the Singing 
Revolution. 
Political Opportunity 
Perestroika and glasnost provided an opportunity for social mobilization and open 
questioning of the legitimacy of the existing power base. Unknowingly, the Soviets made 
a strategic mistake and released the people’s power. It allowed the creation of a totally 
new nonviolent frontline that the Soviet Union did not know how to fight.244 
  
239 Gene Sharp, “Conducting the Struggle,” Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 
21st Century Potential (Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers, Inc. 2005), 493. 
240 According to Ruutsoo, “Ten Points of Civil Disobedience” included the following guidance to the 
population:Do not obey military orders that contradict Estonian Republic laws; do not reveal information 
that could initiate hostile activity against Estonia;do not respond to provocations; make notes and keep the 
Soviet hostilities chronology in order to inform international community;maintain citizen movements and 
establish alternative structures; be ready to conduct mass actions and strikes. Rein Ruutsoo, Rahvarinne 
1988, 301. 
241 Ibid., 301. 
242 Jenkins, “Civilian-Based Defense Discussed in Moscow and Baltics,” 5. 
243 Bruce Jenkins, “Center of Ethics of Nonviolence Formed in Moscow,” in Nonviolent Sanctions: 
News From The Albert Einstein Institution I, no. 3 (Winter 1989/90): 2, 
http://www.aeinstein.org/organizations/org/03_winter89_90-1.pdf. 
244 According to Bruce Jenkins: “The director of the Ethics Section of the Institute of Philosophy, Dr. 
Abdusalam Guseinov, stated that the conference organizers had hoped to gain a broad survey of the ‘field’ 
through the differing perspectives. He explained that Soviet scholars were new to this area (‘the Russian 
tongue must learn to speak this word nonviolence again’); hence, they wanted to see what was ‘out there.’” 
Ibid.,1‒2.  
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Mass Media 
Internal mobilization resources like mass media, government infrastructure and 
publishing houses were extensively used by the movement. After 1987, censorship was 
gradually eliminated in the Baltics.245 For example, the newspaper Noorte Hääl 
periodically released anti-mining articles, while the journal Kultuur ja Elu published a 
special edition on the dangers of phosphorus mining.246 Estonian Radio was the 
mouthpiece for moderate autonomists to spread their message.247  
In 1988, the journals Looming and Kultuur ja Elu continuously released glasnost 
(transparency) articles.248 In 1989, the civil resistance had access to publishing houses in 
Tartu. The publishing houses also had print runs for popular Russian movements in 
defiance of the regime.249 The local regime, despite professed free speech, continued to 
try to censor the media for vilification of the Soviets. 
C. SUMMARY 
Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan classify the Singing Revolution as having 
achieved full success.250 The civil resistance campaign’s secret weapons were the 
Estonian culture and singing. Civil resistance made effective use of conditions created by 
the Soviet Union. The resistance was aided by pre-established social networks, a strong 
narrative and a strategy of civil resistance.  
As a result of perestroika and glasnost, President Gorbachev made political 
mobilization resources such as mass media, infrastructure and Communist Party 
resources available to the movement. Another of the Soviet Union’s strategic mistakes 
245 Lagerspetz, “Social Problems in Estonian Mass Media 1975‒1991,” 359. 
246 Laar, Ott, and Endre, Teine Eesti, 165.  
247 Johnston and Aarelaid-Tart, “Generations, Microcohorts, and Long-Term Mobilization: The 
Estonians National Movement, 1940‒1991,” 689. 
248 Laar, Ott, and Endre, Teine Eesti, 240.  
249 Nils R. Muiznieks “The Influence of the Baltic Popular Movements on the Process of Soviet 
Disintegration.” Europe-Asia Studies, 47, no. 1(1995): 6, http://www.jstor.org/stable/153191.  
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was to diminish KGB control over the population, which allowed oppositional 
subcultures to shift from covert opposition to open civil resistance. 
The case study shows clear evidence that pre-established decentralized social and 
official organizations and groups such as youths, students, poets, musicians, artists, 
writers, scientists and others played a crucial role in the Singing Revolution. The use of 
civil resistance, discipline and clear goals indicates the presence of strategic planning. 
The four years of civil resistance was nonviolent, which indicates leaders and followers 
understood the doctrine. 
  
 59 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 60 
V. THE DRUZE RESISTANCE IN ISRAEL, 1981‒1982 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As one outcome of the Arab-Israeli Six Day War in 1967, Israel occupied the 
Golan Heights. Tayseer Mara’i and Usama R. Halabi describe the region as most of the 
Qunaytra province and parts of southwest Syria, a mountainous plateau coveted for its 
strategic position and water resources.251  
The outcome of the conflict was devastating for the Golan Heights’ inhabitants. 
Bashar Tarabieh explains, “During the 1967 war, 95 percent of the population of the 
Golan Heights, 130,000 people in 129 villages, fled or was expelled by invading Israeli 
forces.”252 The Druze population of the Golan Heights, protected by the mountainous 
terrain, were mostly untouched by the armed conflict. Mara’i and Halabi note that six 
Druze villages survived the war.253 According to R. Scott Kennedy, the whole population 
of the Druze in the Golan Heights was 13,000.254 
Israeli actions after the conflict were a clear sign of permanent occupation. Israeli 
military forces were put in charge, old Syrian currency was changed to Israeli currency 
and new vehicle license plates and identification cards were issued.255 “The Israelis also 
banned at the beginning of their occupation the Syrian curriculum and replaced it with 
one specially designed to inculcate a sense of separate ‘Druze identity’ distinct from the 
Arab identity—as if members of this eleventh-century offshoot of Islam constituted a 
nation rather than a religious sect.”256 In other words, after the occupation, the Israeli 
government started to radically change Druze society at the grassroots level. This marked 
251 Tayseer Mara’i and Usama R. Halabi, “Life under Occupation in the Golan Heights,” Journal of 
Palestine Studies 22, no. 1 (Autumn 1992): 78, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2537689. 
252 Bashar Tarabieh, “Education, Control and Resistance in the Golan Heights,” Middle East Report, 
no. 194/195, Odds against Peace (May‒August 1995): 44, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3012791. 
253 Mara’i and Halabi, “Life under Occupation in the Golan Heights,” 79. 
254 R. Scott Kennedy, “The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance,” Journal of 
Palestine Studies 13, no. 2 (Winter 1984): 50, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2536896. 
255 Mara’i and Halabi, “Life under Occupation in the Golan Heights,” 80.  
256 Ibid., 81. 
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the beginning of the decades-long Arab Druze resistance to annexation and refusal to 
cooperate. 
1. Significance of the Case 
The 1982 general strike by the Druze was a remarkable example of civil 
resistance.257 The Druze resistance, unlike the Cedar Revolution and the Singing 
Revolution, was effective despite the much smaller numbers of participants. The Druze 
resistance succeeded through the wise use of civil resistance strategy and exploitation of 
the enemies’ weaknesses. The religious nature of the conflict also created an especially 
strong narrative. The Druze noncooperation campaign was significantly nonviolent 
during the whole campaign. Mubarak E. Awad said the campaign was “…well organized, 
and intelligent in its methods, ideas, and the execution of classic non-violence tactics.”258  
2. Synopsis 
In 1981, Israel made a decisive step to gain control over the Golan Heights. On 
June 3, 1981, Druze residents held a strike to protest the arrest of five local leaders 
suspected of inciting violence against Israel.259 On November 5, Israeli roadblocks 
prevented Druze high school students from reaching their school in the Golan Heights 
village of Masada. The students had refused to take part in classes promoting Israel and 
the Hebrew language.260 
The Druze noncooperation campaign in December 1981 was triggered by an 
aggressive policy adopted by the Israeli government. Kennedy notes, “In a sharp 
departure from parliamentary practice, Begin’s ruling Likud coalition forced through the 
Israeli Knesset the requisite three readings and final passage of legislation formally 
257 Kennedy, “The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance,” 60. 
258 Mubarak E. Awad, “Non-Violent Resistance: A Strategy for the Occupied Territories,” Journal of 
Palestine Studies 13, no. 4 (Summer 1984): 22, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2536988. 
259 “Chronology May 1, 1981‒July 31, 1981,” Middle East Journal 35, no. 4 (Autumn 1981): 607, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4326307. 
260 “Chronology November 1, 1981‒January 15, 1982,” Middle East Journal 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982): 
217, http://www.jstor/stable/4326391. 
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annexing the Golan to Israel, on December 14, 1981.”261 On December 15, the ten 
European Common Market nations condemned the annexation.262 On the same day, the 
Druze initiated a general strike.  
Important developments started occurring on a daily basis, with Israel coming 
under increasing international pressure. On December 16, 1981, Syria asked the UN 
Security Council to impose sanctions on Israel. The next day, the UN Security Council 
unanimously called on Israel to rescind the annexation. Despite the pressure, Israel 
rejected the UN Security Council’s demand.263 
On January 1, 1982, the Israeli army imposed a curfew on Majdal Shams, a town 
in the Golan Heights.264 Days later, the U.S. National Security Council began 
considering action against Israel for imposing martial law on the occupied heights. The 
UN Security Council reopened its debate on the same issue.265 
On February 13, 1982, the Israelis arrested four Druze leaders in the Golan 
Heights for allegedly inciting rebellion. About 3,000 Druze gathered in Majdal Shams 
and declared a general strike.266 Jewish employers responded by firing hundreds of 
Druze.267  
On February 22, the Jerusalem Post reported that the Israeli government had 
ended negotiations with the Druze.268 Within days, the Israelis had sealed off all Druze 
villages.269 Mara’i and Halabi describe Israel actions. “On 25 February, they [Israel] 
imposed a full blockade on the Golan. All transportation in and out of the area was 
261 Kennedy, “The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance,” 53. 
262 “Chronology November 1, 1981‒January 15, 1982,” 220. 
263 Ibid.  
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266 “Chronology January 16, 1982‒April 15, 1982,” Middle East Journal 36, no. 3 (Summer 1982): 
390, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4326428. 




                                                 
stopped; no food or medical supplies were allowed in; water and electricity were cut.”270 
The Israelis had sent a clear message to the Druze; noncooperation would be punished 
with repression. 
On March 11, 1982, Israeli authorities ordered the Druze to obtain Israeli 
identification papers by April 1. The strike by 13,000 Golan Druze stretched to 25 
days.271 On March 16, Israel imposed a new curfew on Majdal Shams for “repeated 
disruptions of public order by town residents.”272 
Kennedy states that, 
The Druze were led to believe that on April 1, 1982, the government effort 
to force citizenship upon them would end. Instead, the Israelis escalated 
from pressure to outright repression. An estimated 14‒15,000 Israeli 
soldiers swarmed into the area. Seizing the village schools for military 
camps, they sealed off the Golan Heights from Israel and the other 
territories…Israel imposed a state of siege which was to last 43 days. 
Electricity and water to the villages were cut off. Several homes were 
destroyed. In one demonstration, nine people were wounded as it was 
broken up. At least two people died because ambulance service to nearby 
hospitals was denied Golani residents as part of the blockade. At least 150 
people were arrested on each of several days…Most received fines for 
failing to have Israeli identification in their possession. During the siege, 
Israeli troops went door-to-door. They forced entry, confiscated the 
villagers’ identification papers from the period of Syrian rule or military 
occupation, and left them Israeli identification papers instead.273 
On April 2, 1982, Israeli attempts to force ID cards on the Druze led to violent 
clashes, leading to injuries to six Israeli soldiers and four Druze. In the same week, 
however, Israel agreed to stop sealing Druze villages.274 Clashes and demonstrations 
continued throughout May.275  
270 Mara’i and Halabi, “Life under Occupation in the Golan Heights,” 83. 
271 “Chronology January 16, 1982‒April 15, 1982,” 391. 
272 Ibid., 392. 
273 Kennedy, “The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance,” 55. 
274 “Chronology January 16, 1982‒April 15, 1982,” 393. 
275 “Chronology April 16, 1982‒July 15, 1982,” Middle East Journal, 36 no. 4 (Autumn 1982):564, 
http://www.jstor/stable/4326470. 
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In June 1982, after the Israelis invaded Lebanon, Lebanese Prime Minister 
Wazzan and two Druze cabinet members resigned in protest.276 Mara’i and Halabi note, 
“By that time all eyes were focused on Israel’s invasion of Lebanon and brutal siege of 
Beirut; it was clear that in these new conditions it was pointless to try pressuring Israel 
over the Golan.”277 
A year later, the Druze leadership ended their sanctions against adherents who 
had accepted Israeli identification cards.278 The next day, Israeli Defense Minister Arens 
called on the Lebanese Druze to accept the central government in preparation for Israel’s 
withdrawal from the region.279 
B. ANALYSIS 
Why did the Druze resistance succeed to the degree that it did? Several factors 
deserve consideration. 
1. Leadership 
The Druze resistance is a great example of civil resistance with decentralized 
leadership. While the Druze had sectarian leaders, the community had existing social 
structure designed to function even without religious and social leaders. Kennedy 
explains, “Leaders may have helped to discern the advisability of various actions, but 
they were primarily responding to what the community as a whole had arrived at through 
consensus. This allowed for continuity in the campaign and the building of momentum 
from one success to the next, even when leaders were placed under house arrest or in 
jail.”280 According to Gene Sharp, “It is natural for the opponent to believe that arresting 
the leadership will cause the movement to collapse.”281 Kennedy elaborates, “On five 
276 “Chronology April 16, 1982‒July 15, 1982,” 568.  
277 Mara’i and Halabi, “Life under Occupation in the Golan Heights Source,” 84. 
278 “Chronology July 16, 1983‒October 15, 1983,” Middle East Journal 38, no. 1 (Winter 1984): 100, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4326730. 
279 Ibid. 
280 Kennedy, “The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance,” 60. 
281 Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, 636.  
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different occasions as many as 2,500 people gathered together to make decisions. The 
decision-making process for the villages was still largely intact because it was centered 
within their religious practices and hence more immune to overt Israeli interference.”282 
These community gatherings showed community cohesion and, Sharp said, can be 
defined as “Guerilla Theater.”283 The resistance leadership was decentralized. In addition 
to religious leaders, the resistance included a younger generation of secular leadership 
such as students, ex-prisoners and graduates who were taking part in the decision-making 
and implementation of civil resistance. Religious leaders provided cover for the activities 
of the young leaders.284 
2. High Participation Level 
A critical factor in the resistance campaign was the Druze’s high level of 
participation considering their relatively small population of 13,000. Participation was 
high because of community sectarian cohesion without internal barriers. This grassroots-
level cohesiveness allowed the people to prepare, coordinate and launch continuous 
strategic-level village resistance. 
The Druze could not militarily defeat Israel, but they were socially organized to 
be able to reduce their dependence on Israel to a minimum. The Druze center of gravity 
was the people’s resilience and their ability to conduct mass-based non-cooperation. 
Internal conditions for nonviolent struggle were good. Therefore, despite Israel’s coercive 
methods, the Druze nonviolent campaign lasted continuously for five months.285  
The Druze set an example of how a nongovernmental actor could stand up to an 
overwhelmingly strong opponent. Mara’i and Halabi describe the Druze organizational 
efficiency. They state, “Demonstrations during the strike were held every few days, 
282 Kennedy, “The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance,” 60. 
283 Gene Sharp states: “Guerilla theater, another method of social intervention, means a disruptive 
skit, dramatic presentation, or similar act. It came to be used in the United States in the late 1960s. The 
disruption may be of speeches, lecture, or normal proceeding of some groups or organization. (The term 
guerilla theater is also used for a spontaneous style of stage theater, usually with a political theme.) Gene 
Sharp, “The Methods of Nonviolent Intervention,” in The Politics of Nonviolent Action, 397.  
284 Tarabieh, “Education, Control and Resistance in the Golan Heights,” 45.  
285 Mara’i and Halabi, “Life under Occupation in the Golan Heights,” 83. 
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sometimes in all four villages at once, sometimes in a single village with residents of the 
others congregating there. Close coordination was maintained throughout via general 
meetings.”286  
3. Regime Loyalty Shift 
Chenoweth writes there was no loyalty shift.287 At the same time, however, 
during the Druze resistance there were recorded events of Israeli security forces’ 
defection and internal loyalty shift among Israel citizens. The Druze demonstrated an 
understanding of the strategic level of nonviolent struggle when they conducted 
nonviolent direct action against Israeli soldiers, who symbolized the girder of Israeli 
political power in the occupied Golan Heights. Kennedy explains how nonviolent direct 
action is linked to loyalty shift: 
One unexpected source of support came from within those soldiers sent to 
enforce edicts against the villagers’ will. Villagers defied a strict curfew 
confining them to their homes to place tea and cookies outside their doors 
for the Israeli soldiers. They engaged them in conversation, and chose not 
to curse them. The early decision to talk with the Israeli soldiers resulted 
in villagers actively seeking soldiers out and speaking with them in their 
native Hebrew which they had been forced to learn in school.288 
Kennedy describes the power of nonviolent direct action: “According to J. Kuttab, 
‘The soldiers were really being torn apart, because they couldn’t handle that type of 
nonviolence.’ The Druze began to expose the vulnerability of military force to nonviolent 
means of struggle.”289 Kennedy explains the situation that Israeli soldiers faced and 
observes, “In the face of a disciplined unarmed civilian population, which threatened 
neither Israeli security, nor the lives of the individual soldiers, the morale and discipline 
of Israeli soldiers began to break down. According to several reports, the division 
commander complained that the Golan situation was ruining some of his best 
286 Mara’i and Halabi, “Life under Occupation in the Golan Heights,” 83‒84. 
287 Erica Chenoweth, “Online Methodological Appendix Accompanying, ‘Why Civil Resistance 
Works,’” http://www.ericachenoweth.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/WCRWAppendix-1.pdf. 
288 Kennedy, “The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance,” 61. 
289 Ibid. 
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soldiers.”290 Kennedy describes how “a huge group of villagers once massed in the town 
square. An Israel official in a helicopter hovering above the crowd ordered the soldiers to 
fire on the crowd to disperse them. The soldiers refused the direct order.”291 
This case reveals asymmetry of nonviolent conflict, where Israel faced multiple 
nonviolent battlefields. Kennedy notes, “Another factor was the active support of a small 
but vocal sector of Israeli society which spoke out in defense of the Golani Druze civil 
and human rights and opposed the annexation.”292 
4. Strategy 
During the Druze resistance campaign, the Druze demonstrated an understanding 
of the implementation of nonviolent strategy. They used a variety of methods for 
nonviolent struggle, which included refusal to cooperate, boycotts, strikes, civil 
disobedience, peaceful demonstrations and even creation of alternative institutions and 
infrastructure to preserve basic life conditions. The Druze had a clear objective: 
preservation of their identity. 
Jonatan Kuttab, a Palestinian lawyer, explains the Druze’s indirect approach. “We 
don’t have a military option. It doesn’t pay for us to throw rocks or stones. We can never 
outviolence the Israeli army. But we can—through unity, cooperation and taking a 
principled stand, and accepting suffering—just refuse to cooperate and withhold our 
consent, and reasonably come to a solution that reserves and preserves our own rights and 
interests, at least in some measure.”293  
As an example, soon after the Israelis demanded that the Druze accept 
identification cards, the Golan Druze community demonstrated its nonviolent fighting 
skills against Israel and even against their own people. According to Kennedy, 
“…opposition to the Israeli move solidified and those who accepted Israeli identity cards 
were often shunned by the entire community. ‘They decided that anyone who accepts 
290 Kennedy, “The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance,” 61. 
291 Ibid., 53‒54.  
292 Ibid., 59. 
293 Ibid., 48. 
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Israeli identity cards is really cutting themselves off from the community.’ ‘They are no 
longer one of us, no longer a Druze.’”294  
The Druze launched a well-planned non-cooperation campaign. Kennedy explains 
that “Druze laborers refused to go to work, crippling industry in the North of Israel for 
several weeks. Many lost their jobs. Those who took Israeli identification continued to be 
ostracized. Nine village leaders, thought to be ‘ringleaders,’ were placed under 
administrative detention (imprisonment without trial).”295  
Another important part of nonviolent struggle is the cohesion of the Druze 
community. Kennedy also notes, “When one village ran short of food, the villagers 
walked en masse to the neighboring village, overwhelming by sheer numbers the IDF 
[Israel Defense Forces] soldiers positioned there to prevent it.”296  
During the non-cooperation campaign, the Druze continued to live their ordinary 
lifestyle, despite Israeli military interference. According to Kennedy, “the elderly and 
young violated curfew in order to harvest crops. Arrest of the elders created greater 
resolve among the villagers. When some of the children were arrested and carted off in 
helicopters, even more went out into the fields, hoping to get a free ride.”297 At first 
glance, this voluntary activity seeking individual imprisonment by the Druze could look 
abnormal, but this is one method of nonviolent struggle. Sharp states, “Actionists may 
deliberately disobey a particular regulation in order to be imprisoned, and may ask to be 
arrested even though police select others for arrest or even though the persons were not 
present on the original occasion. At times the objective is to fill the jails; that is called a 
jail-in.”298  
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Mubarak E. Awad states,” It is important to note that the residents of the Golan 
Heights did, in fact, boycott all Israeli goods and foods which they found it possible to do 
without, and have returned to reliance on local goods, plants, herbs, and other popular 
foods.”299  
Mubarak E. Awad adds,  
Another instance occurred when an Israeli court attempted to try six 
Syrian Druze in the Golan Heights for failure to possess and produce an 
identity card. Several thousand Druze congregated outside the court to 
hand themselves in, insisting that they were all guilty of the same ‘crime’ 
since they also refused to carry Israeli identity cards. It is clear that in both 
these, and in many other examples of support and solidarity, the 
authorities were prevented from achieving their aims. On the contrary, 
they created a strong sense of solidarity, a deeper unity and a more 
stubborn rejection of the Israeli practices.300  
These various examples demonstrate the Druze’s deliberate use of nonviolent 
strategy.  
5. Organization 
The Druze community, being a religious sect, had established a social 
infrastructure and networks without international borders long before Israeli occupation 
of the Golan Heights. In 1975, civil war broke out in Lebanon. After a year, the 
government was not able to provide civil service to remote areas because of ongoing 
armed conflict. Judith Parik notes that at the same time, “In Druze areas chaotic 
conditions promoted an experiment with local, surrogate administration.”301 Mara’i and 
Halabi note, “The Golani villages traditionally lived entirely by agriculture, and in recent 
decades the economy has come to be based almost exclusively on apple cultivation. 
Immediately upon occupation, the Israelis dissolved the ‘collective committees’ elected 
299 Awad, “Non-Violent Resistance: A Strategy for the Occupied Territories,” 32. 
300 Ibid., 33. 
301 Judith P. Parik, “Change and Continuity among the Lebanese Druze Community: The Civil 
Administration of the Mountains, 1983‒90,” in Middle Eastern Studies 29, no. 3 (July 1993): 379, 
http://www.jstor/stable/4283573. 
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in each village by the local farmers to coordinate with the government in Damascus on 
farming issues.  
Bashar Tarabieh states, “Before 1981, the only independent organizations were 
sports clubs. In the aftermath of the strike, these clubs were used for political meetings 
and to host visiting solidarity groups. The strike inspired people to express themselves 
politically, and the sports clubs were the perfect venue. Male and female membership 
increased dramatically after the strike.”302  
6. Narrative 
The two main components in the master narrative of the Druze resistance 
campaign were victimization and vilification. The Israelis forced the Druze to accept a 
new identity. Kennedy notes, “One chief cause for its [the resistance’s] effectiveness was 
that the strike was rooted in a deep sense of the people’s identity: their identity as Druze. 
The symbol of their campaign was provided by the Israelis: the identity card. And the 
objective of their resistance was simple, attainable, and brought these elements together 
in a compelling way: if you are a Syrian Druze, you cannot be an Israeli, so don’t accept 
the identity card! It was as simple as that.” Kennedy points out the Arab Druze message: 
“We’re not fighting Israel, we cannot,” they said. “We’re not against Israel’s security 
interests. Israel can do whatever it wants to us: they can confiscate our land. They can kill 
us. But they cannot tell us who we are. They cannot change our identity.”303 
7. Doctrine 
The Druze demonstrated their collective understanding of strategic level 
nonviolent resistance and the importance of nonviolent discipline when their 
noncooperation campaign resulted in physical and economic suffering. Although the 
Druze had human casualties, however, these casualties never led to collective violent 
302 Awad, “Non-Violent Resistance: A Strategy for the Occupied Territories,” 46. 
303 Kennedy, “The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance,” 53.  
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action.304 The Druze revealed Israel’s poor preparation for dealing with nonviolent 
resistance. Kennedy states that, 
The nonviolent resistance campaign of the Golani Druze is not a definitive 
demonstration of the efficacy of nonviolence. But it is a provocative 
example of the power of a well-disciplined nonviolent campaign against 
tremendous military might. It proved to be difficult to manage by the 
Israelis, who depend ultimately on cooperation with their rule in all of the 
occupied territories in order to maintain it. But, perhaps most significantly, 
it has embodied an alternative for the Palestinians under occupation in the 
wake of the Lebanese war and PLO infighting which have destroyed their 
military capability.305 
8. Other Factors 
During the resistance campaign, the Druze were supported by most of the 
international community. The UN General Assembly adopted, by a vote of 86 to 21, a 
resolution condemning Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights and calling for all 
governments to end all dealing with Israel.306 Meanwhile, ministers of the Arab states 
criticized the United States for supporting annexation of the Golan.307  
C. SUMMARY 
The outcome of the Druze nonviolent campaign was a partial success.308 The 
small Druze community maintained its distinctive status quo but had to carry Israeli 
identification cards. Kennedy concludes, “It is difficult to speculate how the strike would 
have been resolved if the war in Lebanon had not intervened.”309 Israel represented an 
overwhelmingly powerful and coercive opponent. Even international sanctions did not 
have much impact on Israel’s actions.  
304 According to Mara’i and Halabi, in February 1982 the Druze had civilian casualties. Mara’i and 
Halabi note, “Some of the demonstrations turned violent: about thirty-five people were shot during clashes 
with the police.” Mara’i and Halabi, “Life under Occupation in the Golan Heights,” 84. 
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In 1992 Mara’i and Halabi noted, “This is the situation as it stands today; Israel 
identifies the Syrians of the Golan as ‘residents of Israel,’ but not citizens.”310 The Druze 
had a strategic consciousness and full understanding of the political environment, which 
is explained by their extensive use of the nonviolent battlefield. Mubarak E. Awad notes, 
“This campaign appears to be well organized, and intelligent in its methods, ideas, and 
the execution of classic non-violence tactics.”311  
Despite of the partial success of the Druze resistance, the campaign revealed the 
weakness of Israel’s Army and the strong character of the Druze community. The Israeli 
military was not accustomed to conducting operations against a peaceful opponent who, 
using a civil resistance strategy, deliberately steered Israeli military forces onto an 
unconventional battlefield. 
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VI. THE KOSOVO ALBANIAN RESISTANCE IN YUGOSLAVIA, 
1981 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Kosovo is a small Balkan area that covers 4,200 square miles and borders 
Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro and ‘inner Serbia.’312  Kosovo has been the cradle of 
the conflict between Albanian Kosovars and the Serbian ethnic groups for centuries. The 
Serbs consider Kosovo as the birthplace of their nation, “‘the cradle of Serbian 
civilisation’ [sic], their ‘Jerusalem.’”313 On the other hand, Kosovar Albanians consider 
Kosovo their homeland. In the 1980s, it had a population of two million of which about 
90 percent were Albanian.314  
Kosovo Albanians had dominated in the region for two decades. Aleksander 
Petrovic and Dorde Stefanovic describe in detail Albanian domination in Kosovo during 
1961‒1981.315 The turning point in Kosovo’s history was the 1980 death of Jozip Bros 
Tito, the communist statesman of the Yugoslavia Federation. Tito had maintained control 
over the political situation in communist Yugoslavia. Howard Clark describes Tito’s 
[political] attitude as “Weak Serbia, Strong Yugoslavia.”316 The political situation started 
to change soon after Tito’s death. 
312 Howard Clark, “Background on Kosovo,” in Civil Resistance in Kosovo (London: Pluto Press, 
2000), xix, http://balkanwitness.glypx.com/civil-resistance-in-kosovo.pdf. 
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315 Aleksander Petrovic and Dorde Stefanovic note and classify Albanians’ ethnic domination during 
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university and the Academy of Sciences. Albanian was the de facto official language and the Albanian flag 
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In March and April 1981, Kosovo witnessed sporadic civil resistance by Albanian 
students at Pristina University. Among scholars, the resistance campaign still offers many 
unsolved questions, even myths. For example, still unknown is the death toll or identities 
of the leaders of failed riots. Patrick F. R. Arhsien and R. A. Howells stated in 1981, “As 
a result of these disturbances, 11 persons were reported killed, 57 injured and 22 
arrested.”317 Miranda Vickers writes in 1998, “Officially it was reported that eleven 
people had died, but Albanians say the true number was almost 1,000.”318  
Dava Norbu explains the roots of the conflict. “Traditionally Kosovo has been the 
ethno-homeland of Albanians. Most Albanians are Muslims and their language is of the 
Indo-European origin. They deeply resented Serbian hegemony in both Kosovo and 
Belgrade; it is one of the dynamics of Albanian Islamic nationalism. Following Tito’s 
death in 1981, the Albanians revolted; their slogan was ‘We are Albanians not 
Yugoslavs!’”
319
At the same time it must be noted that, according to Mertus, “Kosovo 
Albanians are both Muslim and Christians and that Kosovo Albanians have never 
identified themselves in terms of religious identity.”320  
Ekavi Athanassopoulou wrote:  
Kosovo, a province of Serbia, was granted significant autonomy under the 
1974 Yugoslav Constitution. By the end of the 1970s, ethnic rivalry in the 
province was mounting, and in 1981 nationalist unrest among Kosovo 
Albanians produced large demonstrations aimed at achieving the status of 
a republic within the Yugoslav Federation, and thus independence from 
Serbia. The movement was crushed, and six years later the autonomous 
status of the province came under attack.”321 
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1. Significance of the Case 
The significance of the Kosovo Albanians’ civil resistance is noteworthy because 
of its preconditions, failure and consequences. Riots in Kosovo caused huge damage to 
Kosovar Albanians and paved the road to future armed conflict in the 1990s. Julie Mertus 
quotes Albanian political stakeholders: “‛The demonstrations were our handicap,’ 
Mahmut Bakali would say in 1995. ‘They were not needed at that time,’ Azem Vllasi, an 
Albanian politician who appeared close to Milosević until his falling out in 1989, would 
agree, ‘We weren’t ready.’ The 1981 demonstrations did more harm than good.”322 
In 1981, the Kosovar Albanians had almost perfect alignment of necessary and 
sufficient conditions to conduct successful civil resistance. Kosovo’s society was out of 
balance, consistent with Chalmers Johnson’s description of a disequilibrated social 
system.323 At that time, Kosovo experienced high levels of social poverty, unemployment 
and low income. In 1981, Kosovo was the poorest autonomous province in the Republic 
of Serbia of the Yugoslav Federation.324  
Despite favorable conditions and Kosovar Albanians’ collective desire for social 
change, the student civil resistance campaign was sporadic, uncontrolled and lacking in 
common goals. Kosovar Albanians, despite being the majority in Kosovo, had 
experienced victimization by the Yugoslav Federation since 1970 and 80 percent of the 
political dissidents in prison were Albanians.325 Kosovo Albanians are by nature a 
homogeneous crowd. Although they were ethnically cohesive, demonstrators failed to 
politically mobilize people.  
322 Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War, 46. 
323 Chalmers Johnson, “The Disequilibrated Social System,” in Revolutionary Change, 2nd ed. 
(California: Stanford University Press, 1982), 61‒90. 
324 Arhsien and Howells, “Yugoslavia, Albania and the Kosovo Riots,” 420. 
325 Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War, 76. 
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2. Synopsis 
Howard Clark describes the simple cause and events of the first day of violent 
riots in Pristina University on March 11, 1981. More than 2,000 students participated.326 
Clark states, “On 11 March 1981 a student in the university canteen found a cockroach in 
his soup. This sparked a protest that converged with a crowd leaving a football 
match.”327 Demonstrators did not control the escalating violence during the 
demonstration so students, instead of maintaining nonviolent discipline, stoned the 
police. Eighteen people were injured, including two security forces members.328 “‛I was 
afraid a revolution would break out,’ admitted party chief Mahmut Bakalli in a 
conversation in December 1991 to explain why he had called out the province’s security 
forces.”329 As the day progressed, it grew in militancy, ultimately being dispersed with 
arrests and tear gas. Hardly a word appeared in the Yugoslav press.330  
Kohl and Libal elaborate. Students apparently moved towards the communist 
party main office. University professors and local stakeholders managed to cool them 
down and students started to turn back to the dormitories. Everything changed when a 
new group of 200 students arrived and demanded the release of their fellow students and 
shouted slogans against Kosovo party stakeholders. The police used tear gas but were 
stoned by students. The violent clash injured 16 students and 2 policemen.331 This 
marked the beginning of a month-long Kosovar-Albanian student resistance campaign.  
Pristina University students’ primary goal was to improve their living and welfare 
conditions. Carole Roger notes, “Their demands were relatively modest: edible cafeteria 
food and better, less crowded dormitories.”332 According to Julie A. Mertus, the situation 
was peaceful for several weeks after the first riot until on March 25 a violent 
326 Arhsien and Howells, “Yugoslavia, Albania and the Kosovo Riots,” 419.  
327 Christine von Kohl and Wolfgang Libal, “Kosovo, the Gordian Knot of the Balkans,” in Kosovo, in 
the Heart of the Powder Keg, ed. Robert Elsie (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 54.  
328 Ibid., 55. 
329 Ibid. 
330 Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo, 41–42. 
331 Kohl and Libal, “Kosovo, the Gordian Knot of the Balkans,” 54‒55. 
332 Roger, “Where It All Began,” 167. 
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demonstration erupted, in the southern part of Kosovo in Prizren.333 Kohl and Libal cited 
a Serbian newspaper report that about thirty demonstrators in Prizren had conducted 
hooliganism. Bystanders did not join in the demonstrators’ bandwagon. Instead, they 
harangued them.334  
The next day a violent demonstration occurred again in Pristina, where Albanian 
students occupied dormitories.335 This time, students suffered casualties. Julie A. Mertus 
notes, “The Pristina daily Rilindja reported that thirty-five people were wounded and 
twenty-one students arrested in this second wave of protests.”336 No one controlled 
students or the police. 
According to Howard Clark, students organized a March 26 meeting near the 
university and planned to debate professors and local stakeholders, including politicians. 
At this point, students escalated their demands seeking better conditions overall. Serbian 
special police units expelled students from the university dormitories and later launched a 
frontal attack against student residences. The state media did not release any news in 
public about the ongoing riots in Pristina.337 Soon after this event, insurrections occurred 
all over Kosovo. Mertus describes the events as following:  
No longer a student protest but a mass revolt, the unrest moved across 
Kosovo. Six cities erupted on April 1 and 2, bringing tens of thousands of 
miners, workers, teachers, students, civil servants, Albanians from all 
walks of life onto the streets. Rioters allegedly marched with young 
children in front, as shields, as they moved against the police, throwing 
rocks and smashing store windows. The federal government declared a 
state of emergency, bringing in federal troops and helicopters to patrol 
cities, major roadways and borders. Paratroopers occupied an airfield strip 
in Pristina; the entire province was sealed off; a curfew was imposed; 
schools and factories were closed and all signs of normal life came to a 
standstill. At one point up to thirty thousand federal troops patrolled the 
333 Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War, 30.  
334 Kohl and Libal, Kosovo, in the Heart of the Powder Keg, 56. 
335 Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War, 30.  
336 Ibid.  
337 Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo, 42. 
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province; Kosovars experienced their presence as a “military 
occupation.”338 
The government violence and random arrests against demonstrators had a 
boomerang effect. Mertus explains, “On April 3, demonstrations spread to Kosova 
Mitrovica, Vučitrn, and Uroševac from there to nearly every municipality within Kosovo. 
Yugoslav authorities accused the protesters of being armed.”339 Patrick F. R. Arhsien and 
R. A. Howells note, “The disturbances thus took on overt symptoms of Albanian 
nationalism and irredentism, in the form of slogans and demands for the elevation of 
Kosovo to the constitutional status of a republic and, in some extreme cases, for the 
unification of the Albanian population in Yugoslavia with neighboring Albania.340 
On April 6, Belgrade officials announced that for first time the casualty rate, “11 
dead (including 2 policemen) and 57 injured.”341 The next and final student 
demonstration was organized in Pristina on May 19. Once again, student dormitories 
were attacked and occupied by the Serbian security forces. Tear gas was used. Now, 
security forces expelled students from dormitories and ordered them to go home. In 
addition, the University Council was suspended.342 The resistance was over. 
The government showed no mercy to Kosovar Albanians who took part in civil 
resistance. From March to June there were seven hundreds arrests; in the next few 
months 226 of them received jail sentences, some as long as 15 years.343 The Albanian 
civil resistance campaign was a failure. The government started to root out the remaining 
potential resistance elements. 
Clark notes that the “‛nest of nationalism,’ the [Pristina] university, was reined in. 
Students numbers were cut back by 25 percent and the curriculum was re-oriented away 
from humanities towards the sciences, a move seen as more in line with Kosovo’s 
338 Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War, 30.  
339 Ibid, 31. 
340 Arhsien and Howells, “Yugoslavia, Albania and the Kosovo Riots,” 419. 
341 Kohl and Libal, Kosovo, in the Heart of the Powder Keg, 55. 
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343 Ibid.,42.  
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economic needs as well as reducing the dangerous zone where nationalistic ideas 
thrived.”344 Clark adds, “Many Albanians, especially political activists, left the 
country.”345 In reality, many demonstrators who escaped from Kosovo to Albania (249 in 
1981‒1983) were caught and handed over to Yugoslav authorities.346  
B. ANALYSIS 
The 1981 Kosovo resistance was, ultimately, a failure. There are a number of 
reasons for this. 
1. Leadership 
The Kosovo student riots were spontaneous and did not have designated 
leadership. Even the government could not clearly identify who was responsible. Miranda 
Vickers describes the situation: 
Provincial and other Yugoslav leaders continued to point the finger at 
“reactionary” and “counter-revolutionary” circles both inside and outside 
the country (political exiles). Kosovo’s state President Xhavid Nimani was 
more specific, naming the ‘Ballists’ headed by Abaz Ermeni, “Zogists” 
headed by Leka Zogu (son of Albania’s one-time self-proclaimed king 
Ahmed Zogu), and the so-called ‘extremist’ headed by Emil Fazliu.347 
2. High Participation Level 
The participation was relatively light. At their peak, the demonstrations involved 
tens of thousands people, although Kosovo’s Albanian population totaled 1,226,736 in 
1981.348 In addition, Kosovo’s population was highly urbanized, which should have 
allowed rapid mobilization. Petrović and Stefanović state, “By 1980 ethnic Albanians 
344 Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo, 43. 
345 Ibid. 
346 Ibid., 44. 
347 Vickers, “Kosovo Flimsy Bridge-Building Role Collapses,” 202.  
348 Robert Elsie, “The Right to Self-Determination,” in Kosovo in the Heart of the Powder Keg. Table 
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comprised 92% of those employed in the state sector, while only 5% were Serbs….”349 
In other words, the Albanians had perfect conditions to take political power away from 
the regime, but that did not happen. This shows that the majority of Albanians had 
serious commitment problems and, therefore, they were not able to conduct a broad-
based campaign. The people remained loyal to the communists.350  
Law-abiding people do not support hooliganism or unrealistic political demands. 
For example, Mertus notes that the majority of Albanians living in Kosovo did not 
support Kosovo’s unification with Albania.351 Mertus adds, “Furthermore, with respect 
to the 1981 demonstrations, some khojas (Islamic leaders) in Kosovo had explicitly 
refused to support the protests.”352  
Gene Sharp notes that student movements start with one strike against them: 
“Struggles conducted predominantly by students are sometimes weaker than is required 
for success if they do not gain support from other important sectors of the 
population…The mobilization of workers, the middle class, peasants and farmers, 
communications and transportation operators, higher economic groups, and government 
functionaries can give the movement considerably greater power.”353 In Kosovo, 
students failed to win over uncommitted parties at the state level because of sporadic 
violence. Many parties trusted the opponent, the Kosovo Communist Party instead.  
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3. Regime Loyalty Shift 
The Kosovo riots never induced loyalty shift.354 Conditions for regime loyalty 
shift were good but the opportunity for security forces defection was already lost on the 
first day, March 11. Students in Pristina insulted Kosovo Communist Party leaders and 
shouted antigovernmental slogans, instead of relaying the real problem to officials. 
Students, knowingly or unknowingly, had stepped into high politics and the Kosovo 
Communist Party Chief Mahmut Bakali called up the police.  
The party controlled strategic mobilization resources such as mass media and 
infrastructure; moreover, it was in charge of security forces. Albanians accounted for 
two-thirds of the League of Communists in Kosovo by 1981 and about 75 percent of the 
police force.355 On March 26, Rahman Morina, Kosovo minister of the interior, requested 
official help against the demonstrations.356 Demonstrators could not disseminate 
information about their real grievances and problems, and therefore could not create 
sympathy among security forces. 
4. Strategy 
The Kosovo civil resistance did not have a strategy. It did not seek consensus on 
how to solve the original problem. The spontaneous movement had no designated 
leadership or formal umbrella organization. There was no one to decide on strategy. Julie 
Mertus explains, “According to interviews with participants, there was little advance 
knowledge of the action—nor could there have been—as police would have disrupted the 
protest before it began. Most students who joined in the demonstrations say that they just 
happened to be at the university when they heard and saw fellow students beginning to 
gather.”357  
354 Erica Chenoweth, “Online Methodological Appendix Accompanying, “Why Civil Resistance 
Works,” 64, http://www.ericachenoweth.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/WCRWAppendix-1.pdf. 
355 Roger D. Petersen, “Yugoslavia,” in Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and 
Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe, ed. Margaret Levi (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 220‒221.  
356 Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War, 58.  
357 Ibid., 29.  
 83 
                                                 
Gene Sharp explains the importance of strategic planning when he says, “All 
strategic planning…requires that the resistance planners have a profound understanding 
of entire conflict situation, including attention to physical, historical, governmental, 
military, culture, social, political, psychological, economic, and international factors. 
Strategies can only be developed in the context of the particular struggle and its 
background.”358 A clear indication of the lack of civil resistance strategy was the 
unrealistic demands for political transformation. 
5. Organization 
The civil resistance was handicapped by not having pre-established organization. 
Julie Mertus states, “Although the March 11 demonstrations were planned by someone, 
most Albanians believe that someone to be a group of students.”359  
Five covert resistance groups/cells with different political goals were present 
before the demonstrations or were formed soon after the failed resistance. Three groups, 
the National Liberation of Kosovo, the Group of Marxist Leninists of Kosovo and the 
Red Front, wanted Kosovo-Albania unification. Other groups, such as the Communist 
Party Marxist-Leninist of Yugoslavia and the Movement for an Albanian Republic in 
Yugoslavia, wanted republic status for Kosovo.360 It is unclear what role any of these 
organizations had in the demonstrations. According to Mertus, the one clear thing was 
that most Albanians denied any relationship with the various organizations because of 
fear. Moreover, many people did not join the demonstrations just because of the Marxist-
Leninist overtones.361  
Howard Clark has come to the same conclusion. The “first demonstrations were 
not organized by dissident cells inside Kosovo. Of the ‘counter-revolutionary groups’ in 
Kosovo detected by Yugoslav police in 1985, more than two thirds were formed after the 
358 Gene Sharp, “Planning Strategy,” in From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework 
for Liberation, 4th U.S. (East Boston: Albert Einstein Institution, 2004), 47, http://www.aeinstein.org/wp-
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demonstrations. Rather, the process has been likened to a ‘national awakening.’”362 Even 
government officials had a hard time finding the organizations that could be held 
responsible for the riots. 
6. Narrative 
The civil resistance movement did not control the main narrative. Strategic-level 
messages were shaped by the journalists. Julie Mertus explains the ongoing situation. 
“Regardless, once the media blackout was lifted, local journalists would zero in on these 
more controversial signs, presenting them as the demonstrators’ key political 
demands.”363 Mass media were under the control of the Kosovo League of Communist 
Provincial Committee.  
The resistance campaign had a deceptive main narrative mixed with unrealistic 
political demands. For example, protesters demanded Kosovo’s unification with Albania 
but most Albanians did not want that. The students’ real demands vanished during the 
campaign and were reshaped by the Communist Party or local journalists based on 
placards and slogans.  
Julie Mertus describes demonstrators’ various slogans and placards: 
The Crowd shouted slogans and carried placards demanding “Kosovo 
Republic,” “Stop the Exploitation of Trepča” [a mine in Kosovo], “Protect 
the Rights of Albanians Outside Kosovo,” “Improve Living Conditions for 
Students and Workers,” “Stop Repression, Free Political Prisoners,” 
“Down with the Greater-Serbia Chauvinism.” Some demonstrators also 
were reported to have boasted pro-Albania messages, such as: “We are 
Enver Hoxha’s Soldiers,” “Down with Revisionism, Long Live Marxism-
Leninism,” “We are Albanians, Not Yugoslavians,” and “We Want United 
Albania!364 
Howard Clark offers an excellent example when he notes that, 
…no matter how many small groups adopted names echoing Enverist 
ideology, the fierce atheism and general authoritarianism of the Hoxha 
362 Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo, 44. 
363 Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War, 31.  
364 Ibid., 38.  
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regime and the country’s poverty made immediate unification unattractive. 
A placard such as the reported, “We are Enver Hoxha’s soldiers” was not 
proposing a political programme, but striking a pose.365 
The variety of political messages created strategic-level confusion and instantly 
backfired. Most of the slogans were not related to the original welfare problem raised by 
the students. The demonstrations were labeled by Yugoslav officials as 
counterrevolutionary, which was a huge blow.366 “The Federal Secretary of Internal 
Affairs, Stane Dolance, declared: ‘Albanian irredentists are now showing their true face, 
they no longer talk about a republic but say ‘long live Enver Hoxha.’ It is quite clear that 
what is really involved is the integrity of the Yugoslav State.’”367  
7. Doctrine 
Demonstrators had little nonviolent discipline. In fact, their violence diminished 
the potential of any loyalty shift by the security forces. Attacks on the police made them 
become brutal. According to Kohl and Libal, Albanian bystanders witnessed Albanian 
and Serbian forces killing demonstrators. The Albanian security members were trusted 
members of the Communist party.368  
Gene Sharp writes, “Where discipline is weak or absent, there is danger that a 
nonviolent demonstration may, in a tense situation, lead to major riot which would most 
likely both shift attention from the original grievance and also alienate support.”369 The 
demonstrators’ lack of nonviolent discipline cost them the sympathy of the Kosovo 
people.  
Riots that occurred in Kosovo were in some cases just hooliganism, driven by 
students and later by laborers who had different political views and demands. Julie 
Mertus concludes that, “Several Kosovo Serbs who witnessed the demonstrations 
described the crowd as ‘bewildered’ and not knowing what they were doing. The press at 
365 Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo, 44. 
366 Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War, 45.  
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that time described the crowd in identical terms.”370 Maria Vickers describes the 
demonstrators’ violent action on March 16 in Pristina. “This time, Serb and Montenegrin 
citizens were beaten, their homes and businesses burned, and their shops looted. 
Kosovo’s Serb population was now seriously alarmed.”371 The demonstrators 
unknowingly, through violent acts, had diminished the potential for external third-party 
support and cooperation. 
Another strategic mistake was the demonstrators’ failure to use nonviolent 
methods beyond strikes and mass demonstrations. Gene Sharp argues, “The common 
error of past improvised political defiance campaigns is the reliance on only one or two 
methods, such as strikes and mass demonstrations.”372  
8. Other Factors 
Several lesser factors, described in the following paragraphs, played a role, as 
well. 
Political Opportunity 
During the resistance campaign, limited symbolic external support was provided 
by fellow Albanians living in Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, where people 
conducted pro-Albanian demonstrations.373 The support diminished quickly. Julie Mertus 
notes, “In Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia proper and Kosovo, Slavs began to boycott 
Albanian owned stores and bakeries, cutting their sales by as much as 85 percent.”374 
Weak narrative and poor strategic decisions were responsible for the lack of widespread 
support. 
  
370 Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War, 66. 
371 Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo, 197. 
372 Gene Sharp, “Exercising Power,” in From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework 
for Liberation, 4th U.S. ed. (East Boston: Albert Einstein Institution, 2004):30, 
http://www.aeinstein.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/FDTD.pdf.  
373 Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War, 31.  
374 Ibid., 41. 
 87 
                                                 
Media 
Foreign media, such as The Washington Post, The Economist, The New York 
Times and The Christian Science Monitor covered the ongoing civil resistance campaign, 
but this reporting did not generate support from the international community.375 The 
narrative remained unclear internationally. 
Demographics 
The university had 36,000 students as of 1981 and an additional 18,000 in 
extension programs. Most students studied humanities and therefore had a hard time 
finding jobs after graduation.376 Miranda Vickers comments, “[T]he majority of Albanian 
students were enrolled for courses in the liberal arts curricula studying Islamic art or 
Albanian history and folklore, and Kosovo’s economy could not absorb such abundance 
of graduates in these subjects.”377 Julie Mertus writes, “Kosovo had the dubious honor of 
having the highest ratio of both students and illiterates in Yugoslavia. The Albanian 
nationalist movement in Kosovo found its most vocal supporters and leaders among the 
young, educated unemployed.”378 Aleksander Petrović and Dorde Stefanović note the 
importance of the high concentration of youth: “In 1981, 52% of the inhabitants of 
Kosovo were under 20 years of age, and ratio of students per 1,000 inhabitants was 274.6 
in Kosovo and 194.9 in Yugoslavia as a whole.”379  
This also partly explains why demonstrators preferred violent civil resistance. 
Unlike the youth demographic, politically mature people knew that mass mobilization 
against a regime could result in violent struggle. Mass violence means military 
involvement, and the Yugoslav Federation had the third largest army in Europe. 
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C. SUMMARY 
The Kosovo civil resistance movement of 1981 was a failure. Gene Sharp helps to 
explain the first strategic mistake: “By placing confidence in violent means, one has 
chosen the very type of struggle with which the oppressors nearly always have 
superiority. The dictators are equipped to apply violence overwhelmingly.”380 The 
students’ chose to use violent struggle against the Albanian Communist Party, the 
strongest legitimate organization in Kosovo. 
During the riots, the demonstrators had different demands and slogans, 
demonstrating that there was no common goal, organization, leadership or strategy. It 
was a total mess, with demonstrators belonging to different groups expressing political 
demands that did not align with the real issues raised by the Pristina University students. 
This created a nightmare in strategic-level messaging. 
The demonstrators lost the information war from the beginning. The students 
could not create what Gene Sharp defines as “cause-consciousness”381 to justify their acts 
of disobedience. Lack of strategic-level communication between governmental officials 
and the wider audience existed.  
In conclusion, the students expressed their grievances the wrong way. Miranda 
Vickers notes, “However, by all accounts the disturbances were a far cry from a 
revolution in any sense of the word. Pristina’s huge student body, which spent much of 
its time roaming the central avenues of the city, created the perfect conditions for the 
eruption of discontent. This very large number of students represented a political and 
social time-bomb.”382 But, they lacked direction. 
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VII. TESTING THE HYPOTHESES 
In this chapter, I compare the critical requirements of civil resistance identified in 
Chapter II and the four case studies to examine the validity of the hypotheses. The 
primary hypothesis and supportive hypotheses help answer the research question, what 
are the requirements for successful civil resistance under occupation?  
A. THE PRIMARY HYPOTHESIS 
The primary hypothesis is that effective civil resistance can be a critical part of a 
strategy for total defense under occupation. The research and the case studies indicate 
that resistance can be a critical part of a broader strategy and can be mixed with a military 
campaign for total defense under occupation.  
The Cedar Revolution, the Singing Revolution and the Druze Resistance suggest 
that civil resistance is an effective strategy when armed resistance is impossible or overly 
expensive and the opposition is clearly a superior force. All three case studies 
demonstrate that civil resistance offers an extremely broad range of tactics that can 
effectively create an asymmetrical conflict, in which the opposition’s military superiority 
is diminished. 
Also, it is relatively easy to mobilize the citizenry for a nonviolent campaign 
compared to a violent conflict. Civil resistance, in turn, can mobilize the population for 
future violent struggle if necessary.  
1. Supporting Hypotheses 
The supporting hypotheses provide the “how” for the primary hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1: Civil resistance needs decentralized leadership to be successful. 
The empirical research presented in Chapter II suggests that the presence of 
leadership is paramount. Analysis of the case studies strongly supports this hypothesis 
and reveals the importance of leadership. For instance, the leadership played a critical 
part during the Cedar Revolution. Leaders were responsible for strategic messaging and 
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initiating a peaceful resistance movement. For example, influential politician Samir 
Frangieh declared the beginning of the peaceful resistance campaign. In addition, the La 
Chamber Noire working group was responsible for the campaign planning, financing and 
cooperation with the students, who represented revolutionary muscle at Martyrs’ Square.  
The Singing Revolution had strong leaders who were easily identified such as 
Edgar Savisaar, Marju Lauristin, Mart Laar, Tunne Kelam, Lagle Parek, Heiki Ahonen 
and Tiit Maddisson.383 The leadership initiated political mobilization through different 
events, such as The Popular Front Harta (declaration) in 1988 to support perestroika, 
“Song of Estonia 88” and The Baltic Chain event.  
The Singing Revolution leadership was decentralized. The original leadership 
established support cells or local chapters that in turn created need for lower-echelon 
leadership. For example, the Popular Front’s decentralized leadership settled in the 
regional councils and support cells all over the country. The Heritage Society’s 
decentralized leadership was located in numerous clubs. 
The Druze resistance, in turn, demonstrates efficiency and the viability of 
decentralized leadership. Israel detained Druze leaders during the Druze resistance 
campaign but could not neutralize emerging guerilla theater activities organized by the 
decentralized Druze leadership. During the resistance, decisions for action were made by 
the community, but behind the scenes young secular leaders including students and ex-
prisoners were shaping the decision making and execution of the civil resistance 
campaign. 
A lack of leadership was one of the reasons the resistance failed in Kosovo. 
Without leaders, the movement was spontaneous and did not have strategic-level political 
consciousness. There was no leadership to foster peaceful civil resistance or construct 
political messages and justify actions. Without leadership, the students did not understand 
the strategy or capabilities and restrictions necessary for successful non-violence on civil 
resistance. In summary, the research and case studies strongly support the hypothesis that 
successful civil resistance needs a decentralized leadership. 
383 Vesilind, The Singing Revolution, 110‒111.  
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Hypothesis 2: The higher the participation level, the greater the effectiveness of 
civil resistance. 
The Cedar Revolution’s high participation level clearly supports this hypothesis 
through several examples. The Cedar Revolution had more than one million 
participants.384 High numbers made civil resistance effective because demonstrators 
outnumbered the security forces, thereby creating a significant level of legitimacy. Syrian 
forces were forced to leave Lebanon. Secondly, the fact that many demonstrators were 
members of different associations increased the effectiveness of the resistance and 
launched paralyzing social boycotts against the regime. 
The Singing Revolution offers similar examples. For instance, 150,000 people 
supported an initiated self-managing economic program in 1988 and forced the Estonian 
Communist Party who opposed the program to cooperate.385 The high participation level 
made the program legitimate. The program later allowed the Popular Front to create 
support cells, which in turn increased participation and national-level political 
mobilization. Another example is the “Song of Estonia 88” event with hundreds of 
thousands of participants. High participation at the event created legitimacy for the 
movement.  
The Druze resistance had a high participation level. That allowed a continuing 
non-cooperation campaign even under an Israeli blockade. The high participation level 
allowed the Druze to use swarming tactics. They outnumbered Israeli soldiers who had 
been sent to the Golan Heights to conduct blockades in different villages. Despite the 
Israeli efforts, the Druze delivered supplies to the villages.386 Israel employed 14,000‒
15,000 soldiers to control the situation in the Golan Heights.387 The Druze high 
participation level made civil resistance effective despite Israel’s overwhelming military 
power. Kosovan civil resistance, on the other hand, did not have a high participation 
384 Stephan, Muslim Women in War and Crisis, 178. 
385 Ruutsoo, Rahvarinne 1988, 265. 
386 Kennedy, “The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance,” 53. 
387 Ibid., 55. 
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level. The movement could not gain popular support. The research indicates that civil 
resistance with a low participation level is likely to fail. 
Hypothesis 3: Likelihood of civil resistance success is directly related to regime 
loyalty shift. 
The research in Chapter II demonstrates that regime loyalty shift may increase 
civil resistance success. The Singing Revolution does offer some examples of loyalty 
shift that made civil resistance more effective. For instance, in 1988 the new Estonian 
Communist Party leader, Vaino Valjas, officially supported civil resistance. In 1990, the 
Communist Party lost legitimacy when most of the members left, which allowed the 
Popular Front to take the leading role in the Supreme Soviet of Estonia. In Kosovo, 
extensive violence by the movement failed to gain sympathy for regime supporters. 
Empirical research in Chapter II indicates that regime loyalty shift can increase 
civil resistance effectiveness, but regime loyalty shift was a factor only in the Singing 
Revolution, where the communist party leadership changed sides but the security forces 
did not until 1991.Within the confines of the case studies, regime loyalty shift does not 
seem to improve the likelihood of successful civil resistance. More important are 
decentralized leadership, strategy, narrative and organization. 
Hypothesis 4: Civil resistance can be an effective component of total defense 
when it is integrated with and nested within a broader strategy.  
While the four civil resistance campaigns studied in this thesis were not explicitly 
combined with military campaigns, they did serve broad political strategies. The Cedar 
Revolution and the Druze resistance leadership utilized a non-cooperation strategy that 
included a civil resistance component. Lebanon’s President Emil Lahoud was forced to 
step down because of civil resistance. The Druze utilized effective civil resistance tactics 
that were integrated into a peaceful noncooperation campaign. In contrast to other cases, 
the Singing Revolution’s mainstream movement, The Popular Front, used a cooperation 
strategy with the Estonian Communist Party in order to infiltrate the Supreme Soviet of 
Estonia. Effective civil resistance forced the communists to cooperate and later shift 
loyalty. The Estonian National Independence Party and The Heritage Society utilized 
civil resistance but not a broad cooperation strategy. The research and examples from the 
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cases strongly support the idea that civil resistance can be integrated and nested within a 
broader strategy. It does not mean that the resistance movement’s broad strategy cannot 
use violence, but civil resistance must remain disciplined and integrated in a broad 
strategy. 
Hypothesis 5: Civil resistance is more effective when it is embedded in existing, 
informal social networks and organizations.  
The case studies strongly suggest that existing organizations and social networks 
are a critical requirement for successful civil resistance. In particular, the Cedar 
Revolution and the Singing Revolution relied on strong existing organizations and 
networks. 
The Cedar Revolution strongly supports the third hypothesis. The case study 
reveals that organizations such as the Beirut Merchants’ Association and the Lebanese 
Bar Association and labor unions were responsible for the nationwide social boycott.388 
Sectarian communities also played an important role in political mobilization.  
The Singing Revolution offers an excellent example supporting this hypothesis. 
On January 16, 1988, the head of the Estonian Communist Party, Karl Vaino, explained 
how the resistance movement was using already established social and informal networks 
and organizations at the grassroots level. He pointed out that the political opposition was 
nested in different newspapers, national television and radio.389 Vaino’s speech was an 
accurate illustration of the situation. Many communist party members joined the 
resistance. Membership in the communist party was necessary for those who wanted to 
work in most governmental position; therefore, many resistance participants were party 
members. 
The Druze resistance campaign in the Golan Heights in 1981, despite being 
classified as only partially successful, demonstrated that existing informal networks were 
crucial for the movement’s development. Among the Druze, loyalty to local religious 
388 Rudy Jaagar and Maria J. Stephan, “Lebanon’s Independence Intifada: How an Unarmed 
Insurrection Expelled Syrian Forces,” in Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and 
Governance in the Middle East, ed. Maria J. Stephan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 174. 
389 Laar, Ott, and Endre, Teine Eesti, 217‒218. 
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leaders is paramount, and in the past, the Druze often have opposed coercive regimes.390 
The Druze community has a unique religious structure and network. The strong social 
identity and communal bonds allowed successful mobilization of large numbers of 
people.391 A case study of the 1981 Kosovo student riots clearly indicates that weak 
networks were partially responsible for its failure.  
Hypothesis 6: A narrative based on national glorification, victimization, and 
targeted vilification of the enemy can motivate and sustain effective civil 
resistance.  
Social movement theory emphasizes narrative as an important part of civil 
resistance. Civil resistance movements, successes and failures alike, typically have a 
narrative. 
The Singing Revolution and the Cedar Revolution both carried a strong master 
narrative of victimization and injustice. The illegitimate occupation by the Soviet Union, 
deliberate pollution of nature, and crimes against humanity such as mass deportations, 
motivated hundreds of thousands of Estonians to participate in a civil resistance 
campaign. In Lebanon, the story of Syria’s illegitimate occupation and political killings 
triggered civil resistance against Syria and its puppet government in Lebanon. The Druze 
resistance master narrative was the Israeli government’s insistence on the Druze giving 
up their identity. 
In Kosovo, one reason for the failure of civil resistance was an incoherent and 
inconsistent narrative, with some elements pushing for Kosovan independence and others 
veering off into student rights issues. Some protestors were seeking release of political 
prisoners while others argued for protection of the rights of Albanians outside Kosovo. It 
did nothing to invite support from third parties or national security forces. For example, 
Kosovo’s Communist Party leader Mahmut Bakalli considered the civil resistance 
movement to be counter-revolutionary. Overall, the case studies validate this hypothesis 
as an important requirement for civil resistance.  
390 Nina Landfield Ostrovitz, “Who Are the Druze,” World Affairs 146, no. 3, Subnational Conflict 
(Winter 1983‒84): 272–273, http://www.jstor/stable/20671992. 
391 Kennedy, “The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance,” 58. 
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Hypothesis 7: A doctrine of incremental and proportional violence through 
primarily unarmed means can increase the effectiveness of civil resistance.  
The case studies support this hypothesis. Civil resistance campaigns like the 
Singing Revolution, the Cedar Revolution and the Druze resistance maintained and 
utilized the doctrine of disciplined action mostly through nonviolent means to gain their 
popular legitimacy.  
The Singing Revolution offers a good example of the doctrine of disciplined 
nonviolence. In 1988, within a short period, the Popular Front quickly grew into a 
mainstream movement because its support cells mushroomed all over Estonia. The 
Popular Front deliberately and officially fostered the doctrine of disciplined nonviolence 
in its Harta declaration. Tens of thousands of people joined the movement and created the 
Popular Front support cells. Later, many members participated in the “Song of Estonia 
88,” which was the groundbreaking event during the Singing Revolution. More than 
200,000 Estonians took part.392 
The Cedar Revolution offers another example. Despite Lebanon’s multifaceted 
sectarian warlike culture and violent past, the Cedar Revolution did not experience 
violence. Again, Samir Frangieh, one of the civil resistance leaders, fostered the doctrine 
of nonviolence and discipline when he announced that the people should wage a peaceful 
intifada.393 
The student movement in Kosovo failed to maintain discipline, which backfired 
and caused a loss of legitimacy. Violence did not represent any of the students’ values 
and repelled potential supporters, such as Islamic leaders in Kosovo, who opposed the 
movement instead.394 The intended audience, such as laborers in the state sector, 
perceived the violence negatively and remained loyal to the communists.395 It should be 
noted that without organization or media attention, a civil resistance strategy might fail to 
392 Laar, Ott, and Endre, Teine Eesti, 418. 
393 Jaagar and Stephan, Civilian Jihad, 172. 
394 Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War, 33. 
395 Keiichi Kubo, “Why Kosovar Albanians Took Up Arms against the Serbian Regime: The Genesis 
and Expansion of the UÇK in Kosovo,” 1135‒1152. 
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achieve its intended effect, creating a political backfire. Kosovo’s Communist Party 
labeled the students’ activity counter-revolutionary. The case studies suggest that this 
hypothesis is valid. Incremental violence was not observed in the case studies and, thus, 
its effectiveness is not fully supported. 
 98 
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ESTONIA 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS  
History has shown that small states involved in armed conflict against an 
overwhelming powerful enemy must wage a total war for survival. Small states cannot 
rely solely on their conventional military forces or coalition support but must use the 
entire nation’s military and nonmilitary capabilities. Estonia, even as a NATO member, 
must take the possibility of occupation seriously and should not rely on outside support 
for national survival. 
The following proposals are presented for how a civil resistance strategy can be 
operationalized in Estonia.  
1. Leadership 
National authorities must prepare and educate local officials on how to conduct a 
successful civil resistance campaign during military conflict and under occupation. The 
Estonian National Defense Course, the main course for national-level leaders, should 
include the study of civil resistance and its principles. The leadership must create civil 
resistance campaign plans that the leadership can execute with or without military 
involvement. It is necessary to create multiple decentralized leadership structures, where 
independent leadership can conduct civil resistance without the government. 
Estonian government officials, along with those in exile and local municipal 
officials, must be trained to develop a localized and coordinated civil resistance campaign 
in case of occupation, so they are able to launch a decentralized civil resistance campaign 
against an occupying regime.  
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2. High Participation Level  
Estonia, with its vibrant civil society and associational life, has favorable 
preconditions to achieve high participation levels in case of a civil resistance campaign. 
Estonia has high civil liberties and political rights index according to Freedom House, 
which ranks nations in these areas.396  
I propose to include existing associations that foster Estonian culture and heritage. 
For example, “Song of Estonia, 88” successfully demonstrated that participation levels 
can be raised through collective folklore and singing events. The Estonian Folk Dance 
and Folk Music Association (ERSS) has approximately 26,000 members, including 1,600 
dance and folk groups. In addition, over 300 folk music groups with more than 1,000 
musicians are active.397 It must be noted that the Estonian population is 1,300,000 
people. The ERSS can mobilize family members, relatives and friends, which potentially 
can raise the participation level up to hundreds of thousands of people. For example, the 
expected ERSS mobilization capability for the Song and Dance Celebration in July 2014 
in Tallinn includes over 8,000 folk dancers, more than 20,000 singers and an audience of 
100,000.398  
In addition, other associations and organizations can help achieve a high 
participation level. They include the Federation of Estonian Student Unions, the Estonian 
Teachers Association, the Estonian Education Personnel Union, the Central Union of 
Estonian Farmers, the Association of Information Technology and Telecommunication, 
the Estonian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Estonian Council of Churches and 
the Estonian Actor’s Association. These associations and organizations already have high 
membership and decentralized regional unions. They also have overlapping social 
networks at the national and international levels. The Estonian government must establish 
closer routine ties with these existing networks to prepare itself for effective civil 
resistance.  
396 FreedomHouse, http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/estonia#.U18WaVdpdKQ  




                                                 
3. Organization 
Estonia should exploit established national-level institutions such as the National 
Security and Defense Coordination Unit, the National Defense Committee, the Estonian 
Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Culture. These organizations should create 
working groups to operationalize civil resistance among different organizations and 
associations. Civil resistance must be fostered in the Estonian Defense Forces; 
specifically, the voluntary Estonian Defense League and its sub-organizations such as the 
Women’s Voluntary Defense Organization, the Young Eagles and the Home Daughters.  
The Defense League should include civil resistance as a key nonmilitary task 
because it offers a unique opportunity for people and social subcultures to participate 
even if they are not able or willing to bear arms. The Defense League should not be a 
military-centric organization. In addition, government organizations such as the Estonian 
Folk Culture Center under the Ministry of Culture, the University of Tartu Viljandi 
Culture Academy, and the Estonian Folk Dance and Folk Music Association should be 
included. Other associations, such as hunters groups, volunteer fire departments and sport 
clubs are potential organizations for civil resistance. These organizations can use existing 
social ties with other international civil resistance and nongovernmental organizations. 
4. Strategy  
Traditionally, the Estonian military has not recognized the utility of civil 
resistance as a national defense tool, but the evidence strongly suggests that civil 
resistance has great potential in national defense policy to ultimately defeat a stronger 
opponent. Civil resistance needs to be part of the National Security Concept of the 
Republic of Estonia. Civil resistance must be planned in peacetime. In case of 
occupation, planned civil resistance can be used independently or combined with a 
broader military campaign to create a unified strategy to set the conditions for effective 
low-intensity conflict. A successful civil resistance campaign would substantially raise 
the cost of occupation, and gain international support. Civil resistance would create an 
unconventional battlefield that would be the second line of defense. 
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Civil resistance should be added to the National Defense Strategy as a course of 
action. It is strategically wise to use the maximum capacity of the Estonian civilian 
population and prepare to wage a national-level civil resistance campaign in case of 
occupation. Civil resistance can prevent the creation of a puppet government or deny its 
legitimacy. 
Civil resistance policy should be added to the national defense textbook. In the 
same vein, civil resistance should be part of peacetime national defense education in 
upper secondary schools and in the Estonian Defense Forces conscript training and other 
state institutions. As Robert L. Helvey observes, “People need to understand clearly that 
they hold the very sources of power that a tyrant uses to suppress them, and that the 
people can, collectively, deny those sources to the ruler, making liberation possible.”399  
5. Narrative  
Estonia’s history is rich in civil resistance. Estonians won their freedom from 
Soviet occupation largely as a result of successful civil resistance and the choices made 
by Gorbachev. In the Singing Revolution, hundreds of thousands mobilized to 
demonstrate their objections to the Soviet regime. Given that history, it is reasonable to 
expect that great numbers of Estonians could be mobilized against a new occupying force 
by invoking the success of past civil resistance. The narrative should also incorporate 
recent Russian activities in and around Ukraine in order to emphasize the possibility of 
foreign interference or occupation. 
6. Doctrine 
A doctrine that emphasizes discipline and an incremental nonviolent campaign 
must be fostered in peacetime training and education. Civil resistance exercises designed 
to train the use of resistance methods must be conducted by grassroots-level 
organizations. Civil resistance literature, pamphlets and manuals must be translated into 
the Estonian language and disseminated to the population through open Internet websites 
399 Robert L. Helvey “Some Final Thoughts,” in On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking About the 
Fundamentals (Boston: Albert Einstein Institution 2004), 143. 
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for self-education purposes. The Ministry of Defense and other official institutions should 
have civil resistance sections on their official websites. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
The focus of this thesis is to identify critical requirements for successful civil 
resistance under occupation. While every civil resistance campaign is unique and has 
different combinations of critical factors that determine success or failure, the case 
studies suggest that existing networks, decentralized leadership and disciplined strategy 
are most commonly associated with success. 
In the first chapter, I discussed the purpose of the thesis research and the specific 
problem faced by small states, bringing Estonia’s comprehensive defense strategy into 
focus. I found that the Estonian comprehensive defense strategy includes civil support but 
does not include civil resistance. I concluded that Estonia’s national defense strategy has 
not recognized the potential of civil resistance as a form of unconventional warfare that 
can be an effective component of Estonia’s comprehensive state defense strategy. This 
chapter also presented the research question: What are the requirements for successful 
civil resistance under occupation?  
In the second chapter, I explained the concept of civil resistance and how it was 
defined in Chapter I. The chapter includes comparative analysis of civil resistance, social 
movement, and irregular warfare literature. Scholars of civil resistance have identified 
factors that they consider critical for success, which I identified and compared. The 
analyzed factors were then distilled to create a common set of requirements for successful 
civil resistance and to propose my own list of critical requirements. In the second chapter, 
I concluded that the critical requirements are leadership, high participation level, regime 
loyalty shift, strategy, organization and networks, narrative and doctrine. 
In the third to sixth chapters, four civil resistance cases were analyzed to validate 
or refute the proposed hypotheses listed in the first chapter. The case studies were 
analyzed using the critical requirement list identified in the second chapter. In the 
hypothesis testing chapter, the validity of the primary and supporting hypotheses were 
carefully examined. Recommendations regarding how Estonia should proceed with a 
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total defense strategy using civil resistance were offered. Further research on how to 
operationalize civil resistance in Estonia in case of occupation is needed. 
In conclusion, this thesis has shown that a successful civil resistance campaign 
must satisfy the identified critical requirements and that a civil resistance strategy 
combined with unconventional military action can be an effective component of a total 
defense strategy. Civil resistance can be combined with overt military action or used 
independently. Civil resistance offers an alternative strategy to insurgency or armed 
resistance. Existing research supports this conclusion. 
Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash conclude that combining civil resistance 
with military campaigns has succeeded during occupation on several occasions. Roberts 
and Ash cite the resistance campaign faced by the Apartheid Republic of South Africa in 
1983‒1994. The Apartheid regime encountered insurgency. This mixed strategy was 
successful and the white minority government was replaced.400 The same strategy was 
used successfully in the Northern Ireland civil resistance campaign of 1967‒1972.401 
Michael Beer notes the use of mixed strategy in Burma, El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Romania, South Africa and Palestine.402 
In summary, civil resistance can be an effective component of a total defense 
strategy when combined with military action under the occupation. Civil resistance 
strategy offers to small states an option to defend or continue effective unconventional 
warfare in case of occupation. 
400 Tom Lodge, “The Interplay of Non-violent and Violent Action in the Movement against Apartheid 
in South Africa, 1983‒1994,” in Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent 
Action from Gandhi to the Present, ed. Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash (New York: Oxford 
University Press), 213‒230.  
401 Richard English, “Northern Ireland, 1967‒72,” in Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The 
Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present, ed. Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash 
(New York: Oxford University Press), 75‒90. 
402 Michael A. Beer, “Violent and Nonviolent Struggle in Burma: Is a Unified Strategy Workable?” in 
Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective, ed. Stephan Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah 
Beth Asher (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1999), 174‒184. 
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF NONVIOLENT CAMPAIGNS 
Table 2.   List of Nonviolent Campaigns 
Campaign Location Target Start End Outcome 
Intifada Sudan Jaafar Nimiery 1985 1985 Success 
 Palestine Israel Occupation 1987 1990 Partial 
Success 
 Zambia British Rule 1961 1963 Success 
Carnation 
Revolution 
Portugal Military Rule 1974 1974 Success 
 Greece Military Rule 1974 1974 Success 
 South Korea Military Junta 1979 1980 Failure 
Prodemocracy 
Movement 
Pakistan Zia Al-Huq 1983 1983 Failure 
 Mali Military Rule 1989 1992 Success 
 Slovenia Communist 
Regime 
1989 1990 Success 
The Stir Nepal Monarch/Panchaya
t Regime 




El Salvador Martinez 
Dictatorship 
1944 1944 Success 
 Poland Communist 
Regime 
1956 1956 Partial 
Success 
 Argentina Attempted Coup 1986 1986 Success 
 Chile Ibanez regime 1931 1931 Success 
 South Korea Military 
Government 




South Africa Apartheid 1952 1961 Failure 





1989 1989 Success 







1956 1957 Failure 
Diretas Já Brazil Military Rule 1984 1985 Success 





Ghana British Rule 1951 1957 Success 
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2003 2003 Success 
Prodemocracy 
Movement 
Thailand Suchinda Regime 1992 1992 Partial 
Success 
Kifaya Egypt Mubarak Regime 2000 2003 Partial 
Success 
People Power Philippines Ferdinand Marcos 1983 1986 Success 
 Taiwan Autocratic Regime 1979 1985 Partial 
Success 





1973 1973 Success 
 Poland Communist 
Regime 
1968 1970 Partial 
Success 
 Croatia Semipresidential 
System 
1999 2000 Success 
Ruhrkampf 
Resistance 
Germany French Occupation 1923 1923 Success 
 Senegal Diouf Government 2000 2000 Success 
Prodemocracy 
Movement 
Tanzania Mwinyi Regime 1992 1995 Partial 
Success 





1976 1979 Failure 
Prodemocracy 
Movement 
East Germany Communist 
Regime 
1989 1989 Success 
 Peru Fujimori 
Government 









Burma Military Junta 1988 1988 Failure 




Soviet Occupation 1968 1968 Failure 
Antiapartheid South Africa Apartheid 1984 1994 Success 
Tulip 
Revolution 
Kyrgyzstan Akayev Regime 2005 2005 Success 
Active Voices Madagascar Didier Radsiraka 1991 1993 Success 
 Chile August Pinochet 1983 1989 Success 
Cedar 
Revolution 
Lebanon Syrian Forces 2005 2005 Success 
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Campaign Location Target Start End Outcome 
 Bolivia Military Juntas 1977 1982 Success 





1989 1989 Success 
 Thailand Thaksin Regime 2005 2006 Success 
 China Communist 
Regime 
1989 1989 Failure 
 Pakistan Khan Regime 1968 1969 Partial 
Success 
 Hungary Soviet Occupation 1956 1956 Failure 
 Zambia Chiluba Regime 2001 2001 Success 
 Albania Communist 
Regime 
1989 1989 Partial 
Success 
Anticoup Venezuela Anti-Chavez Coup 2002 2002 Success 
 Venezuela Jimenez 
Dictatorship 
1958 1958 Success 
 Tibet Chinese 
Occupation 
1987 1989 Failure 
 Guyana Burnham/Hoyte 
Autocratic Regime 




Slovakia Czech Communist 
Government 




Iran Shah Reza Pahlavi 1977 1979 Success 
 Nigeria Military Rule 1993 1999 Success 





Guatemala Ubico Dictatorship 1944 1944 Success 
 Mongolia Communist 
Regime 
1989 1990 Partial 
Success 








Philippines Estrada Regime 2001 2001 Success 
 Bulgaria Communist 
Regime 







1989 1989 Success 
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Campaign Location Target Start End Outcome 
 Haiti Jean-Claude 
Duvalier 
1985 1985 Success 
 Mexico Calderón Regime 1989 1990 Partial 
Success 
 Benin Communist 
Regime 
1989 1989 Success 
Druze 
Resistance 
Israel Israel Occupation 
of Golan 
1981 1981 Partial 
Success 
 Bangladesh Military Rule 1989 1990 Partial 
Success 
 Belarus Communist 
Regime 
1989 1989 Partial 
Success 
Solidarity Poland Communist 
Regime 
1981 1989 Success 
 Ghana Rawlings 
Government 
2000 2000 Success 
 Romania Ceausescu Regime 1987 1989 Failure 
 Nepal Nepalese 
Government, 
Martial Law 








1981 1981 Failure 
Kosovo 
Albanian 




Lithuania Lithuanian Regime 1989 1991 Success 
Prodemocracy 
Movement 
Madagascar Radsiraka Regime 2000 2003 Success 
Student 
Revolution 





1989 1989 Success 
Orange 
Revolution 
Ukraine Kuchma Regime 2001 2004 Success 
 Mexico Corrupt 
Government 
1987 2000 Success 
 Belarus Belarus 
Government 





1970 1971 Failure 
 West-Papua Suchinda Regime 1992 1992 Failure 
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1989 1989 Success 
 Uruguay Military Rule 1984 1985 Success 
Timorese 
Resistance 
East Timor Indonesian 
Occupation 
1988 1999 Success 
 East Germany Communist 
Regime 







1990 1995 Failure 
 Niger Military Rule 1991 1992 Failure 
Independence 
Movement 




Russia Anticoup 1990 1991 Success 
 East Germany Communist 
Regime 
1953 1953 Failure 






1968 1968 Partial 
Success 
 El Salvador Military/Civilian 
Junta 
1979 1981 Failure 
Source: Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, “Table A.1 Nonviolent Campaigns,” Appendix, in Why 
Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. Series of Columbia Studies in Terrorism 
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APPENDIX B: NONVIOLENT ACTION METHODS 
Table 3.    198 Methods of Nonviolent Action 
 
 113 
  114 
  115 
 




LIST OF REFERENCES 
Abd-Allah, F. Umar. The Islamic Struggle in Syria. Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1983. 
Ackerman, Peter, and Berel Rodal. “The Strategic Dimensions of Civil Resistance,” 
Global Politics and Strategy 50, no.3 (2008): 111‒126. Accessed October 16, 
2103. doi: 10.1080/00396330802173131.  
Ackerman, Peter, and Christopher Kruegler. Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The 
Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century. Praeger, 1994, xxiv. 
Ackerman, Peter, and Jack Du Vall. “Nonviolent Power in the Twentieth Century,” 
Political Science and Politics 33, no. 2 (June 2000): 146‒148. Accessed 
November 27, 2013. http://www.jstor.org/stable/420882. 
Albert Einstein Institution. “A Brief Glossary of Nonviolent Struggle.” Nonviolent 
Sanctions: News from Albert Einstein Institution, I, no. 3 (Winter 1989/90): 5‒8. 
———. Report of Activities 2000‒2004. Boston: Pride Printers, 2004. 
———. “198 Methods of Nonviolent Action.” Accessed November 29, 2103. 
http://www.aeinstein.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/198_methods-1.pdf.  
Arguilla, J. “Warfare in the Information Age.’’ Lecture notes, Defense Analysis 
Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, Spring 2011.  
Arhsien, Patrick F. R., and R. A. Howells. “Yugoslavia, Albania and the Kosovo Riots.” 
The World Today 37, no. 11 (November 1981): 419‒427. Accessed January 01, 
2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40395240. 
Athanassopoulou, Ekavi. “Hoping for the Best, Planning for the Worst: Conflict in 
Kosovo.” The World Today 52, no. 8/9 (August‒September 1996): 226‒229. 
Accessed November 27, 2013. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40475849. 
Awad, E. Mubarak. “Non-Violent Resistance: A Strategy for the Occupied Territories,” 
Journal of Palestine Studies 13, no. 4 (Summer 1984): 22‒36. Accessed 
December 5, 2013. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2536988. 
Bartkowski, M. J. Recovering Nonviolent History, Civil Resistance in Liberation 
Struggles. Colorado Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013. 
  
 117 
Beer, A. Michael. “Violent and Nonviolent Struggle in Burma: Is a Unified Strategy 
Workable?” In Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective. 
Edited by Stephan Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher .Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 1999, 174‒184. 
Benford, D. Robert. “Controlling Narratives and Narratives as Control within Social 
Movements.” In Stories of Change: Narrative and Social Movements. Edited by. 
Joseph E. Davis. New York: State University of New York Press, 2002, 53‒75. 
Blanford, Nicholas. Killing Mr. Lebanon: The Assassination of Rafik Hariri and Its 
Impact on the Middle East. New York: I.B Tauris, 2006. 
Burrowes, J. Robert. The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense: A Gandhian Approach. 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996. 
Chenoweth, Erica. “Online Methodological Appendix Accompanying, ‘Why Civil 
Resistance Works.’” Accessed March 5, 2014. 
http://www.ericachenoweth.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/WCRWAppendix-
1.pdf.  
Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J. Stephan. Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic 
Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. Edited by Bruce Hoffman. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2013. 
“Chronology April 16, 1982–July 15, 1982.” Middle East Journal 36, no. 4 (Autumn 
1982): 563–581. Accessed December 4, 2013. http://www.jstor/stable/4326470. 
“Chronology January 16, 1982–April 15, 1982.” Middle East Journal 36 no. 3 (Summer 
1982): 389–414. Accessed December 4, 2013. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4326428. 
“Chronology July 16, 1983–October 15, 1983.” Middle East Journal 38, no. 1 (Winter 
1984): 99–114. Accessed December 4, 2013. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4326730.  
“Chronology May 1, 1981–July 31, 1981.” Middle East Journal 35 no. 4 (Autumn 1981): 
595–613. Accessed December 12, 2013. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4326307. 
“Chronology November 1, 1981–January 15, 1982.” Middle East Journal 36, no. 2 
(Spring, 1982): 217–236. Accessed December 4, 2013. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4326391.  
Clark, Howard. “Backround on Kosovo.” In Civil Resistance In Kosovo. London: Pluto 
Press, 2000, xix. Accessed January 6, 2013. http://balkanwitness.glypx.com/civil-
resistance-in-kosovo.pdf. 
 118 
Davis, E. Joseph. Stories of Change: Narrative and Social Movements. New York: State 
University of New York Press, 2002. 
Dawa, Norbu. “The Serbian Hegemony, Ethnic Heterogeneity and Yugoslav Break-Up.” 
Economic and Political Weekly 34, no. 14 (April 3–9, 1999): 833–838. Accessed 
November 11, 2013. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4407822. 
Droff, Patricia Lee. “Chronology 1991.” Foreign Affairs 71, no. 1 America and the World 
1991/92 (1991/1992): 184–226. Accessed November 11, 2013. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20045117. 
Elsie, Robert. Kosovo in the Heart of the Powder Keg. New York: Columbia University, 
1997. 
English, Richard. “Northern Ireland, 1967‒72.” In Civil Resistance and Power Politics: 
The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present. Edited by 
Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008, 75‒90. 
Estonica, Encyclopedia about Estonia. “Total Defense.” Accessed August 21, 2013. 
http://www.estonica.org/en/National_defence_system/Total_defence/. 
‒‒‒‒‒. “Perestroika and Glasnost.” Accessed October 28, 2013. 
http://www.estonica.org/en/Perestroika_and_glasnost/ 2013. 
‒‒‒‒‒. “Estonian National Independence Party.” Accessed October 30, 2013. 
http://www.estonica.org/en/Estonian_National_Independence_Party/. 
‒‒‒‒‒. “Deportation of March 1949.” Accessed November 5, 2013. 
http://www.estonica.org/en/Deportation_of_March_1949/.  
‒‒‒‒‒. “Phosphorite War.” Accessed November 05, 
2013.http://www.estonica.org/en/Phosphorite_War/. 
‒‒‒‒‒. “The June Deportation.” Accessed November 12, 2013. 
http://www.estonica.org/en/The_June_deportation,_1941/. 
‒‒‒‒‒. “Tartu Peace Treaty.” Accessed November 5, 2013. 
http://www.estonica.org/en/Tartu_Peace_Treaty/. 
Estonian Ministry of Defense. “Estonian National Defense Development Plan 2013‒
2022,” 1–7. Accessed March 12, 2014. Last modified March 04, 2014. Translated 
by Margus Kuul. http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin 
/nodes/13204_Riigikaitse_arengukava_2013-2022.pdf. 
 119 
———. “Defense Policy, National Security Concept of Estonia.” Accessed August 13, 
2013. http://kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/nodes 
/9470_National_Security_Concept_of_Estonia.pdf. 
Freedom House. “Estonia.” Accessed March 28, 2014. 
http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/estonia#.U18WaVdpdKQ  
Hayes, Peter. “Chronology 1988.” Foreign Affairs 68, no. 1, America and the World 
1988/89 (1988/1989): 220–256. November 15, 2013. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20043893. 
‒‒‒‒‒. “Chronology 1989.” Foreign Affairs 69, no.1, America and the World 1989/90 
(1989/1990): 213–257. Accessed November 4, 2013. 
http://www.jstor.org.stable/20044296. 
Helvey, L. Robert. “Some Final Thoughts.” In On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: 
Thinking About the Fundamentals. Boston: Albert Einstein Institution, 2004,143. 
Hoffer, Eric. “Unified Agents.” The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass 
Movements. New York: Harper Collins, Reissued 2011. 
Internet Medieval Sourcebook. “Urban II: Speech at Council of Clermont, 1095, 
according to Fulcher of Chartes.” Accessed May 13, 2014. 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/urban2-fulcher.html.  
Jenkins, Bruce. “Center of Ethics of Nonviolence Formed in Moscow.” Nonviolent 
Sanctions: News from The Albert Einstein Institution I, no. 3 (Winter 1989/90): 2. 
Accessed March 2, 2014. http://www.aeinstein.org/organizations 
/org/03_winter89_90-1.pdf.  
‒‒‒‒‒. “Civilian-Based Defense Discussed in Moscow and Baltics.” Nonviolent 
Sanctions: News from The Albert Einstein Institution III, no. 3 (Winter 
1991/92):5. Accessed November 19, 2013. http://www.aeinstein.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/nvs-vol.-3-no.3.pdf. 
Johnson, Chalmers. Revolutionary Change. 2nd edition. California: Stanford University 
Press, 1982. 
Johnston, Hank, and Aili Aarelaid-Tart. “Generations, Microcohorts, and Long-Term 
Mobilization: The Estonian National Movement, 1940‒1991.” Sociological 
Perspectives 43, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 671–698. Accessed November 4, 2013. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1389553. 
Johnston, Hank and David A. Snow.”Subcultures and the Emerge of the Estonian 
Nationalist Opposition 1945–1990.” Sociological Perspective 41, no.3 (1998): 
479–497. Accessed November 4, 2013. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3435987. 
 120 
Kaljulaid, Raimond. “Eessõna: Rusikas Taskus.” [The Fist in the Pocket]. In Rahvarinne 
1988: Kakskümmend Aastat Hiljem. [The Popular Front 1988‒Twenty Years 
Later ]. Edited by Aire Veskimäe Tallinn: Tallinna Raamatutrükikoda, 2008, 13–
19. 
Kennedy, Scott R. “The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance.” Journal 
of Palestine Studies 13, no. 2 (Winter 1984): 48–64. Accessed October 10, 2013. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2536896.  
King, M. Luther. “Martin Luther King’s Letter from Birmingham Jail,” 4. Accessed 
February 7, 2014. http://www.uscrossier.org/pullias/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/king.pdf.  
Kubo, Keiichi. “Why Kosovar Albanians Took Up Arms against the Serbian Regime: 
The Genesis and Expansion of the UÇK in Kosovo.” Europe-Asia Studies 62, no. 
7: 1135–1152. Accessed October 18, 2013. doi: 10.1080/09668136.2010.497022. 
Kurtz, R. Lester, and Sarah Beth Asher. “Violent and Nonviolent Struggle in Burma: Is a 
Unified Strategy Workable?” In Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical 
Perspective. Edited by Stephan Zunes. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 1999, 174–
184.  
Laar, Mart, Urmas Ott, and Sirje Endre. In Teine Eesti:Eesti Iseseisvuse Taassünd 1986–
1991. [Another Estonia‒The Rebirth of Independent Estonian 1986–1991]. Edited 
by Elle Veermäe, Leila lehtmets, Kristiina Märtin. Tallinn: SE&JS, 1996.  
Lagerspetz, Mikko. “Social Problems in Estonian Mass Media 1975–1991.” Acta 
Sociologica 36, no. 4 (1993): 357–369. Accessed November 5, 2013. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4200871. 
Lee, Doowan. “Theory and Practice of Social Revolution.” Lecture notes, Defense 
Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Summer 2013. 
Lieven, Anatoli. In The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to 
Independence. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993, 214–315. 
Lodge, Tom. “The Interplay of Non-Violent and Violent Action in the Movement 
Against Apartheid in South Africa, 1983‒1994.” In Civil Resistance and Power 
Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present. 
Edited by Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009, 213‒230.  
Mack, Andrew. “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric 
Conflict.” World Politics, 27, no. 2 (January 1975): 175–200. Accessed May 15, 
2009. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009880. 
 121 
Mara’i, Tayseer, and Usama R. Halabi. “Life under Occupation in the Golan Heights 
Source.” Journal of Palestine Studies 22, no. 1 (Autumn 1992): 78–93. Accessed 
December 4, 2013. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2537689. 
McAdam, Doug. “The U.S. Civil Rights Movement, 1945–70.” In Civil Resistance and 
Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the 
Present. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, 58–74. 
Mertus, A. Julie. In Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War. Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1999. 
Muiznieks, Nils R. “The Influence of the Baltic Popular Movements on the Process of 
Soviet Disintegration.” Europe-Asia Studies 47, no. 1 (1995): 3–25. Accessed 
October 31, 2013. http://www.jstor.org/stable/153191. 
Nugis, Ülo. “Usutlus Ülo Nugisega.” [Ülo Nugis Interview]. In Eestimaa Laul 88. [Song 
of Estonia 88]. Edited Elme Väljaste and Enno Selirand. Tallinn: MTÜ Eestimaa 
Laul, 2011, 219–239. 
Parik, P. Judith. “Change and Continuity among the Lebanese Druze Community: The 
Civil Administration of the Mountains, 1983–90.” Middle Eastern Studies 29, no. 
3 (July 1993): 377–398. Accessed December 4, 2013. 
http://www.jstor/stable/4283573. 
Petersen, D. Roger. “Yugoslavia.” In Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and 
Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe. Edited by Margaret Levi. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 208–254. 
Petrovic, Aleksander, and Dorde Stefanovic. “Kosovo, 1944–1981: The Rise and the Fall 
of a Communist ‘Nested Homeland.’” Europe Asia Studies 62, no. 7 (2010): 
1073–1106. Accessed October 12, 2013. doi:10.1080/09668136.2010.497016. 
Polletta, Francesca. “Plotting Protest.” In Stories of Change: Narrative and Social 
Movements. Edited by Joseph E. Davis. New York: State University of New York 
Press, 2002, 31–51. 
Roberts, Adam and Timothy Garton Ash. In Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The 
Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present. Edited by Adam 
Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
Roeder, Philip G. “Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization.” World Politics 43. no. 2 




Roger, Carole. “Where It All Began.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and 
Society 17, no. 1, Studies in the Social History of Destruction: The Case of 
Yugoslavia (Fall 2003): 167–182. Accessed January 1, 2014. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20020202. 
———. “Tagasivaateid Vabaduse Teele ̋- Eestimaa Rahvarinde Roll Eesti Ajaloos 1988‒
1993.” [Looking Back on the Path of the Freedom ‒ The Role of the Estonian 
Popular Front in Estonian History 1988‒1993]. In Rahva Rinne 1988: 
Kakskümmend Aastat Hiljem. [The Popular Front 1988‒Twenty Years Later]. 
Edited by Aire Veskimäe, Tallinn: Tallinna Raamatutrükikoda, 2008. 234‒321. 
Sandor, Fabian. “Professional Irregular Defense Forces: The other side of COIN.’’ 
Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012. 
Savisaar, Edgar. “Rahvarinde I Kongress: 1. Oktoober 1988.1. a.” [The Congress of the 
Popular Front on October 1, 1988]. In Rahvarinne 1988:Kakskümmend Aastat 
Hiljem. [The Popular Front 1988‒Twenty Years Later ]. Edited by Aire 
Veskimäe,Tallinn: Tallinna, Raamatutrükikoda 2008, 22‒31. 
Savisaar, Edgar, Rein Ruutsoo, Kadri Simson, Aadu Must, Erik Terk, Küllo Harjakas, 
Raimond Kaljulaid, Rein Veidemann, and Ester Šank. In Rahvarinne 
1988:Kakskümmend Aastat Hiljem.[The Popular Front 1988‒Twenty Years Later 
], Edited by Aire Veskimäe. Tallinn: Tallinna Raamatutrükikoda , 2008.  
Selirand, Enno. “Laul Karastas Rahva Tahet.” [The Song Hardened the Will of the 
People]. In Eestimaa Laul 88: Kõned, Fotod, Meenutused, CD. [The Song of 
Estonia 88:Speeches, Photos and Remininscences, CD]. Edited by Elme Väljaste 
and Eerik Kändler. Tallinn: Tallinna Raamatutrükikoja OÜ, 2011, 71–112.  
Sharp, Gene. “Consulting of Nonviolent Action: Learning From the Past Ten Years.” 
Special Double Issue. Nonviolent Sanctions: News from the Albert Einstein 
Institution (Fall 1993/Winter 1994): 3. Accessed November 19, 2013. 
http://www.aeinstein.org/organizations/org/16_fall93_win94-1.pdf. 
‒‒‒‒‒. From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation. 
Fourth U.S. Edition. East Boston: Albert Einstein Institution, 2004, 29–38. 
Accessed January 12, 2014. http://www.aeinstein.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/FDTD.pdf. 
‒‒‒‒‒. Sharp’s Dictionary of Power and Struggle: Language of Civil Resistance in 
Conflicts. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
‒‒‒‒‒. The Politics of Nonviolent Action: The Dynamics of Nonviolent Action. Seventh 
Printing. Edited by Marina Finkelstein. Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 2000. 
 123 
‒‒‒‒‒. There Are Realistic Alternatives. Boston: The Albert Einstein Institution, 2003. 
Accessed January 18, 2014. http://www.aeinstein.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/TARA.pdf. 
‒‒‒‒‒. Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential. 
Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers, 2005. 
Sharp, Gene, and Bruce Jenkins. Civilian-Based Defense: A Post-Military Weapon 
System. Translated by Tiia Kaare. Tallinn: Infomare, 1994. 
Simson, Kadri. “Kommentaarid II Kongressi Kõnedele ‒ Eesti Rahvarinde Roll Ajaloos 
1988‒1993.” [Comments to Speeches during the Second Congress ‒ The Role of 
the Popular Front in Estonian History 1988‒1993]. In Rahvarinne 1988: 
Kakskümmend Aastat Hiljem. [The Popular Front 1988‒Twenty Years Later]. 
Edited by Aire Veskimäe. Tallinn: Tallinna Raamatutrükikoda, 2008, 61‒68. 
Schock, K. “The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance.” Journal of Peace Research 50, 
no. 277 (2013): 277–290. Accessed May 16, 2013. 
doi:10.1177/0022343313476530.  
‒‒‒‒‒. Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies. Edited by 
Bert Klandermans. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005. 
Steinbeck, John. The Moon is Down. New York: Penguin Books, 1995. 
Stephan, Maria J., and Erica Chenoweth. “Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic 
Logic of Nonviolent Conflict.” International Security 33, no. 1 (Summer 2008): 
7–44. Accessed March 13, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40207100.  
Stephan, Maria J., and Jaafar Rudy. Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, 
Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East. Edited by Maria J. 
Stephan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
Stephan, Rita. In Muslim Women in War and Crisis. First Edition. Edited by Faegheh 
Shirazi. Austin: University of Texas, 2010, 175‒197. 
Taagepera, Rein. “A Note on the March 1989 Elections in Estonia.” Soviet Studies 42, 
no. 2 (April 1990): 329–229. Accessed November 15, 2013. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/152084. 
Tarabieh, Bashar. “Education, Control and Resistance in the Golan Heights.” Middle East 
Report no. 194/195, Odds Against Peace (May–August 1995): 43–47. Accessed 
December 4, 2013. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3012791.  
Tarrow, G. Sidney. “Networks and Organizations.” In Power in Movements: Social 
Movements and Contentious Politics. Revised and Updated Third edition. Edited 
by Margaret Levi. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 119–139. 
 124 
Toome, Indrek. “Usutlus Indrek Toomega.”[Indrek Toome Interview]. In Eestimaa Laul 
88. [The Song of Estonia 88]. Edited by Elme Väljaste and Enno Selirand. 
Tallinn: MTÜ Eestimaa Laul, 2011, 203–217. 
Tupp, Enn. “Foreword” to Gene Sharp’s book, Civilian-Based Defense: A Post-Military 
Weapon System, foreword translated by Margus Kuul, book translated by Tiia 
Kaare. Tallinn: Infomare, 1994. 
United States Army Special Operations Command and Johns Hopkins University. In 
Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare II: 1962–2009. Edited by 
Chuck Crossett. Fort Bragg U.S. SOCOM, 2010, viii–x. 
Väljaste, Elme, and Selirand Enno. In Eestimaa Laul 88. Edited by Elme Väljaste and 
Selirand Enno. Tallinn: MTÜ Eestimaa Laul, 2011. 
Velliste, Trivimi. “Vastused Mart Laari küsimustele faksi teel New Yorgist 29. Mail 
1996.” [Trivimi Velliste Answers to Mart Laar Questions via telefax from New 
York on 26 May 1996.]. In Teine Eesti: Eesti Iseseisvuse Taassünd 1986‒1991. 
[Another Estonia: The Rebirth of Independent Estonia, 1986–1991]. Edited by 
Elle Veermäe, Leila lehtmets, Kristiina Märtin. Tallinn: SE&JS, 1996, 312‒335. 
Vesilind, Priit (with James and Maureen Tusty). The Singing Revolution: How Culture 
Saved the Nation. Tallinn: Varrak Publishers, 2009. 
Vickers, Miranda. Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1998. 
von Kohl, Christine, and Wolfgang Libal. “Kosovo, the Gordian Knot of the Balkans.” In 
Kosovo, in the Heart of the Powder Keg. Edited by Robert Elsie. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997.  
Works, C. Benjamin. “News from Kosovo.” Sirius: The Strategic Issues Research 
Institute. Accessed January 11, 2014. http://www.kosovo.net/press1980.html.  
Zisser, Eyal. “Lebanon—the Cedar Revolution-Between Continuity and Change.” 
Orient-Hamburg 47, no. 4 (2006): 460–483. 
  
 125 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 126 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
 127 
